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INTRODUCTION
This article focuses on two neglected aspects of rape law. First, its
tendency to presume sexual consent across a range of social contexts,
overlooking the fact that much social life is predicated on a presumption
against sexual contact. Second, its tendency to ignore a critical empirical
fact: that an overwhelmingly large number of sexual assaults occur during
the first-ever sexual contact between the specific parties involved—what I
term “First Encounters.” The relationship between these two facets of rape
law is crucial. Whereas much of social life operates with an underlying
presumption that people have not consented to sex with others unless they
have given clear signals to that effect—particularly in relationships that
have never before been sexual—rape law does the opposite and presumes
consent where it has never existed. This disconnect constitutes our greatest
overlooked opportunity for meaningful rape law reform.
Accordingly, rape law has been framed around the wrong questions.
The right question, particularly in First Encounters, is whether the accused
sought the victim’s1 consent. The wrong questions—those focused on the
presence of force, or the victim’s reaction to the assault—are based on an
underlying presumption that consent was present if force or lack of consent
cannot be proven. Any legal presumption of consent to sex contrasts sharply
with how people think of their own sexual agency and how they negotiate
consensual sexual relationships in real life. I therefore argue for statutory
reform that focuses on whether, and how, a sexual assault defendant sought
the other party’s consent to the encounter. I propose the offense of
committing first-time sexual penetration or contact without seeking consent.
In the absence of prior sexual contact between parties, the law should
presume nonconsent.
*Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center; J.D. New York
University School of Law; Ph.D, Sociology, Northwestern University. I thank Dwight
Aarons, Alena Allen, Joanne Archambault, Brian Gallini, Ken Levy, Kimberly Lonsway,
James Rocha, Stephen Schulhofer, Deborah Tuerkheimer, and my colleagues who offered
questions and comments in response to presentations (via Zoom) at the University of
Memphis, University of Tennessee, and Willamette University. I am deeply grateful to
Jennifer Carter-Johnson and Linda Greene for their support of my work. I also thank Alisa
Plaisance and Sydney Curtis for superb research assistance.
1
A note on terminology. Throughout, I use the terms “victim” and “complainant”
interchangeably to describe a person reporting or experiencing a sexual assault. Although
the term “survivor” is preferred by many victims, I do not use that term here because
“victim” and “complainant” better distinguish the victim in relation to the perpetrator. In
addition, not all victims of sexual assault survive the experience.
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The Article proceeds in five parts. Part One sets out the central
arguments about the prevalence of a presumption of consent in rape law and
the overlooked importance of the First Encounters case. I focus analysis on
the law’s tendency to presume consent to sex, explaining where this
presumption came from, how it continues to operate today, and why it is
problematic.
Part Two introduces a proposal for statutory reform that is designed to
apply specifically to First Encounter cases and which criminalizes the act of
engaging in first-time sexual contact or penetration without first seeking the
other person’s consent. This “seeking consent” approach focuses the factfinder’s attention on the accused’s conduct rather than the victim’s while
also respecting the victim’s sexual agency.
Part Three analyzes a range of sexual assault cases in order to
demonstrate that the seeking consent approach is a useful corrective to
courts’ common practice of overlooking critical First Encounter dynamics
and ignoring the sexual agency of victims. Judicial opinions that have
trivialized the harm of sexual assault and produced absurd results come out
differently under the proposed approach.
Part Four shows how my proposal builds upon the affirmative consent
debate. It gives an overview of the statewide statutory landscape around
affirmative consent, demonstrating that support for the idea is building
across constituencies, despite critics’ objections. It also demonstrates that
the seeking consent framework proposed here helps to shift the analysis of
consent onto the perpetrator’s actions in seeking consent and away from the
victim’s actions in giving it. Part Five offers additional justifications for the
seeking consent approach.
PART ONE: PRESUMING CONSENT TO SEX
Courts have presumed consent to sex in rape law, both historically and,
in most American jurisdictions, today. This section demonstrates the
linkages between the presumption of consent and the resistance
requirement, and how this presumption stubbornly persists today.
It then introduces the idea of First Encounter sexual assault and places
this dynamic under the microscope, demonstrating how common such cases
are, how courts have largely missed their significance, and why it is
important to embrace these cases as learning tools capable of informing
legislative change. Finally, the section problematizes the presumption of
consent and proposes an alternative: a presumption of nonconsent in First
Encounter sexual assault.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4191840

DATE]

SEX AND NONCONSENT

5

A. The Presumption of Consent
In 1886 a Nebraska widow, age 58, lived alone in a shanty.2 One day, a
man shoveled her snow and carried firewood in for her.3 He then asked for
sex.4 She refused.5 He responded by throwing her down onto the bed and
having sexual intercourse with her, apparently against her will and with
force.6 The victim testified:
“I got away from him once. Then he got me back the second time, he
being strong and I being so weak,––wanting something to eat and fright
together, I had not much strength…I tried to get away the second time,
but could not get away. He kept me till he got satisfaction.”7
The defendant was convicted, but the Nebraska supreme court
overturned the conviction, holding that what had happened was not rape
because the victim’s testimony failed to show such resistance “as would
constitute the offense.”8 The court further explained: “[a]ll that she testified
to may be true, and still the act not have been against her will.”9 In other
words, the court concluded that the victim did not resist enough, and
therefore the sex was likely consensual. In arriving at this holding, the court
admitted its concern that women might pursue “illicit intercourse” for
pleasure and then later claim it was rape when her behavior became
known.10
But what it ignored was the evidence—the lack of any indication of
prior acquaintance between the parties, the coercive circumstances facing
the victim, with a man in her home who was larger and stronger than she
was, and the fact that her nearest neighbors lived about a quarter of a mile
away.11 The court presumed that she may have, or actually did, consent to
sex.
Fast forward to today. Most states have eliminated resistance as an
element of rape, but the requirement of resistance, and the corresponding
presumption of consent if resistance is absent, persists. Nebraska’s current
sexual assault statute defines first degree sexual assault as, inter alia, sexual
2

Matthews v. State, 27 N.W. 234, 234 (Neb. 1886).
Id.at 234.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.at 234-35.
7
Id.at 235.
8
Id. at 236, 237.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
The nearest neighbors resided eighty rods away. Id. at 234. A rod is 16.5 feet.
3

5
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penetration without the consent of the victim.12 But the statutory definition
of “without consent” requires the victim to express that lack of consent
through words or conduct.13 Evidence of resistance is no longer required as
proof that the victim did everything in her power to oppose the act; rather
“[t]he victim need only resist, either verbally or physically, so as to make
the victim’s refusal to consent genuine and real and so as to reasonably
make known to the actor the victim’s refusal to consent.”14
Nebraska’s current law is more enlightened than the 1886 version, but it
reveals that the resistance requirement persists. In the absence of words or
conduct indicating a clear unwillingness to have sex, the court presumes
that the victim consented. Professor Tuerkheimer views this type of
approach as creating a “new resistance requirement.”15 She points out that
requiring “an expression of nonconsent” is “incompatible with an
understanding of women as sexual agents….The new resistance
requirement makes women’s sexual availability the default.”16 To put this
another way, statutes such as Nebraska’s presume consent; they simply do
not recognize nonconsent unless it is clearly expressed.
Nebraska’s current approach to sexual consent illustrates an important
shortcoming in rape law that has led to calls for the adoption of affirmative
consent—the idea that consent is only valid when it is affirmative and freely
given.17 Michelle Anderson helpfully enumerates two models of rape law
reform—the “Yes Model,” which embraces affirmative consent, and the
“No Model,” which does not.18 Only the Yes Model or affirmative consent
approach is an antidote to courts’ presumption of consent.
Nebraska’s approach is an example of Anderson’s “No Model” of rape
law reform, in which rape is generally defined as sexual penetration without
the victim’s consent, although the victim is required to express her lack of
consent clearly, such as by saying “no” or offering physical resistance.19
The No Model is an improvement over the common law approach—which
12

NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(1)(a).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(a).
14
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-318(8)(b).
15
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sexual Agency and the Unfinished Work of Rape Law
Reform, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE, 166, 173-74 (Cynthia
Grant Bowman & Robin West, eds., 2018) (hereinafter “Sexual Agency”).
16
Id. at 174 (emphasis added).
17
See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(1) (West 2021). For an in-depth discussion
of affirmative consent and its critics, see Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, 441,
442-47 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. LAW (2016) (hereinafter, “Affirmative Consent”).
18
Michelle Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 1401, 1404-05 S. CAL. L. REV. (2005).
Anderson rejects both models in favor of her proposed “Negotiation Model,” which has
some similarities to with Seeking Consent approach proposed here.
19
Id.
13
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traditionally required the presence of force as well as the victim’s physical
resistance “to prove her nonconsent”20—because it recognizes rape based
on lack of consent, even in the absence of force. But as we have seen, the
No Model presumes consent in the absence of a clearly expressed objection.
In contrast, the “Yes Model” requires the sex initiator to obtain
affirmative permission from the other person before penetrating him or
her.21 It therefore is the only approach of the three to presume a lack of
consent when a complainant does nothing to express consent. Under both
the common law and the No Model approaches, the law presumes the
complainant’s consent if resistance and/or a verbal “no” is absent.22 As we
shall see in Part Four, infra, the Yes Model is currently used by a minority
of American jurisdictions, although its influence is growing. 23 Most
jurisdictions have yet to confront the presumption of consent and the
inequities that result.
This presumption of consent, and its corresponding default position that
a complaining victim is sexually available, ignores a real-world reality that
is both simple and critical: most human beings do not consent to sex with
the vast majority of the people with whom they come into contact. Rather, a
presumption against sexual contact and sexual availability exists in most
human relationships. Although sexual contact may be commonplace, most
people have sex with a fairly limited universe of partners—one that
excludes most of their acquaintances and family members. Why then should
the law presume that a person is sexually available to anyone who comes
along?
To put it simply, victims of nonconsensual sexual touching should not
have to take affirmative steps to assert their right to be left alone.24 The
burden of resistance that courts have placed on victims for dozens of years
ignores this core facet of social life and allows the court to reason from a
standpoint of presuming the victim’s sexual availability.
There are many contexts in which humans interact with a clear
understanding that the interaction is nonsexual and will foreseeably, and
often undoubtedly, remain so. A mutual presumption of nonconsent to sex
fuels the trust that undergirds a plethora of rewarding and functional
nonsexual relationships, such as those between parents and children, doctors
and patients, and service workers and their clients. Rape law therefore must
20

Id. at 1404.
Id. at 1405.
22
Id. at 1404, 1405.
23
See notes 255-67 and accompanying text.
24
For an expansion of this point, see generally Lucinda Vandervort, Affirmative Sexual
Consent in Canadian Law, Jurisprudence, and Legal Theory, 23 COLUM. J. OF GENDER &
L 395, 405 (2012).
21
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be modified to recognize how important the presumption of nonconsent is
to society and to respect the role that this presumption should play in
adjudicating sexual assault. After all, even if some people are willing to
have sex with nearly everyone, that does mean that everyone shares that
view. So why do we allow the law to presume consent?
That rape law has overlooked the societal presumption of nonconsent to
sex has not gone unnoticed by scholars. Writing in 1987, Susan Estrich
observed that “[i]n spite of the law’s supposed celebration of female
chastity, a woman’s body was effectively presumed to be offered at least to
any appropriate man she knows, lives near, accepts a drink from, or works
for. The resistance requirement imposed on her the burden to prove
otherwise.”25 The Nebraska widow found herself in this position. A man
shoveled snow and carried firewood for her, and that was enough for the
court to see consent to sex.
Professor MacKinnon similarly noted that “[t]he crime of rape is
defined and adjudicated from the male standpoint, presuming that forced
sex is sex and that consent to a man is freely given by a woman.” 26
Professor Tuerkheimer has similarly observed that there is a “[t]elling
judicial inclination to posit, needlessly, the presence of consent—and to do
so under unlikely circumstances. In dicta, judges manifest deep skepticism
of non-consent in the absence of force. The effect is a legal presumption of
perpetual consent.”27 This approach—presuming consent to sex—ignores
the sexual agency of anyone who is on the receiving end of nonconsensual
sexual touching.28
When courts presume consent to sex, they give the accused a legal
advantage that he does not enjoy when negotiating relationships in daily
life. Professor Schulhofer has noted the disconnect between how actual
consent develops and what the law presumes. He has argued that without an
affirmative consent requirement, “[t]he law would, in effect, be assuming
that people are always receptive to sexual intercourse (at any time, with any
person), until they do something to revoke that permission. That is hardly
an accurate description of ordinary life.” 29 And yet courts’ tendency to
presume consent has persisted for decades, except in the minority of
jurisdictions that have adopted the Yes Model. It is time for these critical
25

SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 41 (1987).
CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 180 (1989)
(emphasis added).
27
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape On and Off Campus, 1, 16 EMORY L. J. (2015)
(emphasis added).
28
See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sexual Agency, supra note 14 at 173-74.
29
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of Rape, 35 LAW & INEQ. 335 (2017)
(hereinafter (“Reforming”).
26
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observations about the presumption of consent to shape statutory reform
more broadly.
B. The Link Between the Resistance Requirement and the Presumption of
Consent
The tendency of the law to presume consent to sex is linked,
historically, to the resistance requirement, by which a woman was deemed
to have consented to sex if she did not resist.30 This approach to rape was
set in motion prior to the twentieth century. The earliest versions of the
resistance requirement mandated that the woman resist “to the utmost.”31
An 1897 Georgia case illustrates this standard: “In order that the offense
might constitute rape, she must have resisted with all her power, and kept
up that resistance as long as she had strength. Opposition to the sexual act
by mere words is not sufficient….[t]here must be the utmost reluctance and
resistance.”32 If such resistance is not present, the court presumes consent.
Devoy v. State, a 1904 Wisconsin decision, illustrates this principle. The
seventeen-year-old victim met one of the defendants at a July 4th dance.33
He then led her to an isolated area, where they were approached by a friend
of the defendant.34 The men aided one another in having sexual intercourse
with the victim; each did so twice before she was able to get away.35 The
victim testified that her hands were not free, that one defendant had his
hand over her mouth, and that she kept silent because they threatened harm

30

Devoy v. State, 99 N.W. 455, 456 (Wis. 1904).
Corey Yung, Rape Law Gatekeeping, 58 B.C.L. REV. 205, 212. (2017). Yung
documents the use of this standard in some states through at least 1973. Id. But the pace of
change varied; Colorado, as one example, had abandoned the rule of utmost resistance by
1925. Magwire v. People, 235 P. 339, 340 (Colo. 1925).
32
Mathews v. State, 29 S.E. 424, 426 (Ga. 1897). In Mathews, an adult male forced a
16-year-old girl to consent to sex with him. Because she ultimately consented as a result of
the application of force, the man was convicted not of rape, but of fornication and adultery.
Id. Numerous cases demonstrate the use of the utmost resistance standard. See, e.g.,
Oleson v. State, 9 N.W. 38, 39 (Neb. 1881) (“…it must appear that she resisted to the
extent of her ability.”); Whittaker v. State, 7 N.W. 431, 433 (Wis. 1880) (“Any consent of
the woman, however reluctant, is fatal to a conviction. The passive policy will not
do…There must be the utmost reluctance and resistance.”); Connors v. State, 2 N.W. 1143,
1147 (Wis. 1879) (“…voluntary submission by the woman while she has the power to
resist, however reluctantly yielded, deprives the act of an essential element of rape.”).
33
Devoy v. State, 99 N.W. 455, 455 (Wis. 1904). The opinion states that the victim
was “within two months of eighteen years of age.” Id.
34
Id. at 455.
35
Id. at 455, 455-56.
31

9
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4191840

10

SEX AND NONCONSENT

[VOL

if she did not.36 She also testified that she tried to push them off and fought
them the whole time.37
Most of the opinion is spent analyzing the victim’s actions rather than
the defendants,’ and her actions are found wanting.38 The court faults the
victim for not calling for help and finds “[a] want of the utmost resistance
on her part.”39 As a result, there was no rape and she was presumed to have
consented to sex with both men.40 The court apparently saw little point in
considering other circumstances that suggested an unwillingness to have
sex, such as the fact that the victim had just met the first defendant, that the
other was entirely unknown to her, and that she was outnumbered.
Susan Estrich has observed that although courts have historically treated
women as “passive and powerless” in relation to a range of legal matters—
such as voting, professional identity, and property ownership, the law also
demanded that women be “strong and aggressive and powerful” in relation
to repelling a sexual assault.41 There was simply no willingness to consider
the possibility that a man could force sex on a woman by terrifying or
overpowering her into submission. The result was that courts presumed the
victim’s consent to sex unless she resisted to the utmost. As the New York
Court of Appeals put it in 1874, “[if] a woman, aware that [the sex act] will
be done unless she does resist, does not resist to the extent of her ability on
the occasion, must it not be that she is not entirely reluctant?”42 In short, the
law insisted that women actively and vigorously resist nonconsensual sex.
In doing so, courts enabled a broad range of sexual aggression.
In addition to the concern that women might actually be enjoying sex
that they later called rape, other courts expressed the concern that men
could easily have their reputations ruined by women fabricating rape
claims.43 The Nebraska supreme court admitted that it presumed assertive
action would be forthcoming from a genuine rape victim: “[t]he law
presumes that a woman who has suffered the indignity and brutality of a
36
Id. at 455-56, 457. One defendant displayed a pocket knife; he also allegedly said
that if she did not keep silent she “knew what he would do to her.” Id. at 457.
37
Id. at 457.
38
Id. at 455, 456-57.
39
Id. at 457.
40
Id.
41
ESTRICH, supra note 17 at 31.
42
People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374 (N.Y. 1874).
43
Matthews v. State, 27 N.W. 234, 236 (Neb. 1886). (“The reason for this rule is
apparent, as probably but comparatively few women would admit that they gave their
assent to illicit intercourse. If the mere refusal to give express assent was sufficient to
establish the crime of rape, a very large proportion of the cases of illicit intercourse, no
doubt, could be brought under that head….) Also quoted in Mathews v. State, 29 S.E. 424,
426 (Ga. 1897).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4191840

DATE]

SEX AND NONCONSENT

11

rape will not submit in silence to the wrong, but will at once take the
necessary steps to bring the offender to justice.44
During the mid-twentieth century the resistance requirement softened,
presumably out of a recognition that utmost resistance might result in the
victim’s loss of life.45 The Colorado supreme court noted, in 1925, that the
old rule of “resistance to the utmost” had been “repudiated by the more
modern and enlightened authorities, which require only such resistance as
age, mental and physical condition, and surrounding facts and
circumstances, demand to make opposition reasonably manifest.”46
Colorado applied this softened resistance requirement in the 1959 case
People v. Futamata, although the new standard was not much help to the
victim. In Futamata, the jury acquitted a defendant who laid in wait for the
victim while she walked from her home to her outhouse in the middle of the
night, then repeatedly struck her over the head with a large rock, dragged
her to a car, and demanded sex. 47 The victim, having sustained several
blows to her head, did not have the strength to resist the defendant and felt
that if she did so, he would kill her. 48 She therefore complied—she
removed her clothes when ordered to do so and “submitted to the
defendant’s advances.”49 The fact that the parties had had no prior sexual
contact and that the defendant abducted the victim from her home in the
middle of the night were not enough to persuade the jury that a rape had
occurred; apparently her cooperation with the defendant was fatal to the
prosecution. 50 As MacKinnon has noted, “’[t]o the extent an accused
knows a woman and they have sex, her consent is inferred.”51 In this case,
the defendant “knew” the victim in that he had seen her around the YMCA,
44

Matthews v. State, 27 N.W. 234, 237 (Neb. 1886).
A number of cases describe circumstances where the victim fears for her life if she
does not cooperate. See, e.g. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 538 P.2d 247, 249 (Ca. 1975). This
softening of the resistance requirement followed the tightening of the resistance
requirement in the early twentieth century and was tied to the introduction of the Model
Penal Code’s efforts to reform rape law in the early 1960s. See STEPHEN SCHULHOFER,
UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW 19-29 (1998).
(hereinafter “UNWANTED SEX”).
46
Magwire v. People, 235 P. 339, 340 (Colo. 1925).
47
People v. Futamata, 343 P.2d 1058, 1059 (Colo. 1959).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
The jury in Futamata had to wrestle with somewhat confusing jury instructions,
which the Colorado supreme court held were erroneous because of certain internal
contradictions. Id. at 1061-62. Despite these contradictions, it is striking that the jury found
the defendant’s actions to have been taken without the necessary force, and without
adequate resistance from the victim, in a context where she was abducted from her home in
the middle of the night.
51
MACKINNON, supra note 18 at 176.
45

11
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4191840

12

SEX AND NONCONSENT

[VOL

where they both worked, although there was no evidence that they had ever
spoken.52 The court thus saw consent when he abducted her in the middle of
the night, using force, and compelled her to submit to sex.
After the 1970s, states moved to relax the resistance requirement even
further, recognizing that a victim might not be able to resist at all if she was
sufficiently overcome with fear. California abolished the resistance
requirement through a 1980 statutory reform that defined rape to include an
act of sexual intercourse accomplished “against a person’s will by means of
force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or
another.” 53 This modification removed most references to resistance and
created a path to a rape conviction, without resistance, through proof that
the victim experienced a reasonable fear sufficient to overcome her will.54
Other states made similar modifications at this time. For instance,
Georgia has held, since 1976, that lack of resistance induced by fear is the
functional equivalent of force. 55 Similarly, Hawaii retained the resistance
requirement, but its supreme court gave a more nuanced explanation of
resistance in 1980, stating that “earnest resistance” was a relative term that
had to be measured by all of the circumstances surrounding the alleged
assault.56 It elaborated:
[r]esistance may appear to be useless, and may eventually
prove to be unavailing, but there must have been a genuine
physical effort on the part of the complainant to discourage
and to prevent her assailant from accomplishing his intended
purpose….This is not to say, however, that the woman
threatened with the violation of her person is required to take
unnecessary risks. All the law requires is that her fear must
have been reasonable, and that it was this fear which impelled
her to submit without resisting to the degree of which she was
capable.57
Each of these softened resistance requirements retained the presumption
that the victim consented to sex if she could not meet the demands of the
statute. Whether in California, Georgia, or Hawaii, a victim either had to
resist or had to prove that she was too afraid to do so. In addition, her
52

People v. Futamata, 343 P.2d 1058, 1059 (Colo. 1959).
People v. Griffin, 94 P.3d 1089, 1094 (Cal. 2004).
54
Id.
55
Curtis v. State, 223 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Ga. 1976).
56
The Hawaii statute defined force in relation to what was necessary to overcome the
victim’s “earnest resistance.” State v. Jones, 617 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Haw. 1980).
57
Id. at 1217 (emphasis added).
53
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resistance would have to appear reasonable to the fact-finder.58 If she could
not meet the requisite standard, the court would presume that the sex was
not against her will, and the defendant would be acquitted. The result was
that a conviction continued to rest on the victim’s response to sexual assault
rather than on the perpetrator’s actions, with her consent presumed in the
absence of clear evidence to the contrary. Most courts continued to embrace
a resistance requirement through the end of the 1990s.59
Susan Estrich has noted the illogic of embracing a presumption of
consent to sex rather than the opposite presumption: “[a] system of law that
truly celebrated female chastity, which is the system that these judges
purported to uphold, should have erred on the side of less sex and presumed
nonconsent in the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary. The
resistance test accomplished exactly the opposite. Chastity was celebrated
but consent was presumed.”60
Courts typically are not troubled by the continuing presumption that
consent to sex exists, but a 1907 Idaho decision is a rare example of a court
that did identify and problematize this issue. In State v. Neil, a traveling
salesman met a woman at a dance for the first time; he later offered to walk
her home and tried to rape her on the way.61 She fought him off, and he was
convicted of assault with intent to commit rape. 62 In affirming his
conviction, the Idaho supreme court focused its analysis squarely on the
actions of the perpetrator rather than the victim.63 When the appellant’s
lawyer cited caselaw requiring “utmost resistance,” the court gave this
critical response:
“To our minds the trouble with a number of these authorities is that
they reverse the order of the inquiry. They go about inquiring into
the kind, character, and nature of the fight put up by the woman,
rather than the nature of the assault and evident and manifest
purpose and intent of the assailant. For the purpose of reaching the
conclusions announced in some of these cases, it is necessary to
assume that, in the first place, a man has a right to approach a
woman, lay hold on her person, take indecent liberties with her,
58

Courts have often struggled to grasp the terror that rape victims face and have found
many victims’ fear to be unreasonable. See ESTRICH, supra note 17 at 30-41;
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 37 at 50-51; Robin West, The Difference in
Women’s Hedonic Lives, 3 WISC. WOMEN’S L. J. 81, 95 (1987).
59
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 37 at 31.
60
ESTRICH, supra note 17 at 31.
61
State v. Neil, 90 P. 860, 860 (Idaho 1907).
62
Id. at 861.
63
Id. at 862 (“When the charge is assault with intent to commit the crime of rape, the
intent must be judged and determined by the conduct of the party committing the assault.”)
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and that, unless she “kicks, bites, scratches, and screams” to the
“utmost of her power and ability,” she will be deemed to have
consented, and indeed to have invited the familiarity. Such is
neither justice, law, nor sound reason.”64
This opinion appears progressive for 1907 in its focus on the conduct of
the perpetrator rather than the victim, and in its observation that a
perpetrator does not have the right to approach a victim, demand sex, and
have the law look on with approval unless his victim resists. But this stance
appears to be the exception rather than the rule, even today. This historical
survey has demonstrated a gradual softening, over time, of the obligations
that the law has imposed on victims of sexual assault to express their lack of
consent. But it has also shown that most jurisdictions have not evolved to
the point of dropping this obligation altogether. In most places, the law
continues to presume victims’ sexual availability unless they actively
express a lack of consent.
C. The Stubborn Persistence of the Presumption of Consent Today
Nearly all American jurisdictions have eliminated the physical
resistance requirement, but the presumption of consent tied to this
requirement continues in many guises. First, some jurisdictions in fact
continue to require physical resistance. Idaho defines rape as occurring,
inter alia, “[w]here the victim resists but the resistance is overcome by
force or violence,” 65 although it also recognizes that fear or futility can
make resistance impossible.66 Absent physical resistance or an acceptable
excuse for its absence, Idaho law sees consent and lawful sexual contact,
not rape.
Second, many states continue to follow the approach of providing that
acquiescence or submission arising from fear is sufficient to provide the
lack of consent or the force necessary for a sexual assault conviction.67 This
approach is more favorable to victims and prosecutors than the overt
requirement of physical resistance, but it still demands something from
victims in order to obtain a conviction—a showing of sufficient fear. In the
absence of that fear, this approach does not classify nonconsensual sexual
touching as a crime. Instead, it recognizes a sexual violation because of the
64

Id. (citations omitted).
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(4).
66
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(5-6).
67
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 261, 262, 266(c), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-70, HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 707-733, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5503, MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45-5-511,
VT. STAT. ANN. § 3252.
65
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secondary effect of the victim’s fear. In the absence of fear, the law
presumes consent.
Third, as we have seen, some jurisdictions use the No Model—they
have substituted a verbal resistance requirement for the old physical
resistance approach. 68 These jurisdictions continue to presume that the
victim consented to sex unless there is at least some manifestation of lack of
consent.69 A mere “no” will usually suffice to express lack of consent, but if
a victim says nothing the court will presume that she consented. As
Professor Tuerkheimer has noted, where there is a verbal resistance
requirement, the victim’s sexual availability is the default.70
New York is one example. The New York Penal Code defines lack of
consent as arising, inter alia, from circumstances, at the time of the
penetration or other sexual conduct, where “the victim clearly expressed
that he or she did not consent to engage in such act, and a reasonable person
in the actor's situation would have understood such person's words and acts
as an expression of lack of consent to such act under all the circumstances
(emphasis added).”71 A person who does not or cannot “clearly express” her
lack of consent is presumed to have consented. Ambiguity is construed,
against the victim, as consent.
Fourth, still other jurisdictions require resistance through judicial
interpretation despite the elimination of the resistance requirement from the
relevant statute. Alabama’s rape statute no longer contains a resistance
requirement, but courts have interpreted the statutory “forcible compulsion”
language as, inter alia, “[p]hysical force that overcomes earnest
resistance.”72 Judges sometimes have difficulty letting go of the obsolete
resistance requirement. In People v. Iniguez, discussed more fully in Part
Three, the California court of appeals overturned the defendant’s conviction
based, in part, on its observation that the victim failed to scream for help
despite the fact that her aunt was sleeping nearby and likely would have
awoken and come to the victim’s aid. 73 The California supreme court
reinstated the conviction after pointing out the resistance requirement had
68

Tuerkheimer, Sexual Agency supra note 14 at 173-74.
See, e.g. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-318(8), 319(1) (West) ; N.Y. PENAL LAW. §
130.05(2)(d) (West); UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-402(1), 406(1) (West 2015).
70
Tuerkheimer, Sexual Agency supra note 14 at 174.
71
N.Y. PENAL LAW. § 130.05(2)(d) (West). Legislation is currently pending in New
York that would modify the definition of consent to add an affirmative consent clause. Id.
72
Compare ALA. CODE §13A-6-61(1)(West 2021) (“forcible compulsion does not
require proof of resistance by the victim”); to Higdon v. State, 197 So.3d 1019, 1021 (Ala.
2015) (“Forcible compulsion” [means] “[p]hysical force that overcomes earnest resistance
or a threat, express or implied, that places a person in fear of immediate death or serious
physical injury to himself or another person”).
73
People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183, 1189 (Cal. 1994).
69
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been abolished, and thus placing a burden on the victim to cry out was
contrary to the law.74 But for the state’s appeal, the defendant would have
been acquitted by the imposition of a resistance requirement on the victim
long after it had been eliminated from the statute.
Fifth, police play a gatekeeping role in selecting which sexual assault
complaints to refer to prosecutors. 75 They may require evidence of
resistance in order to investigate and take a case forward, even in the
absence of a statutory requirement.76 When Megan Rondini reported a rape
to police in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, her interviewing officer expressed
skepticism because she had not sufficiently resisted, in his view. During the
interview he said to her, “Look at it from my side….You never kicked him,
hit him, tried to resist him, physically pushed him away, anything like
that.”77
In sum, courts and law enforcement personnel continue to presume that
victims consented to sex unless there is a clear indication to the contrary.
They do so by requiring physical or verbal resistance, force sufficient to
overcome the victim’s will, or fear on the part of the victim. The resistance
requirement also persists in judicial opinions that demand such resistance
even when the relevant statute does not, and in the actions of police officers
who do not take victims seriously without evidence of resistance.
Jurisdictions taking any of these approaches still operate with a requirement
that a nonconsenting victim must indicate her opposition in some way. If
she does not, the court presumes that she consented, and the law fails to
hold culpable those perpetrators who violate the societal presumption of
nonconsent. By not recognizing this presumption, and the sexual agency
that it protects, the law under-criminalizes sexual assault.
D. The Ubiquitous First Encounter Sexual Assault and the Presumption of
Consent

74

Id. The court also noted that it was “sheer speculation” for the court of appeals to
conclude that the defendant would have “responded to screams by desisting the attack, and
not by causing [the victim] further injury or death.” Id. at 1190.
75
Yung, supra note 23 at 207, 219-21, 227-28.
76
Grace Galliano et al., Victim Reactions During Rape/Sexual Assault: A Preliminary
Study of the Immobility Response and its Correlates, 8 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE
107, 107 (1993), https://time.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/galliano.pdf. Vandervort
also notes that law enforcement “often fails to fulfill the promise of law reform initiatives
undertaken to reduce the high incidence of sexual assault.” Vandervort, supra note 16 at
398. Accordingly, changes to the law do not always make their way into practice.
77
Megan Rondini Police Interview Tr. 37 (Jul. 2, 2015) (on file with author); see also John
Archibald, Alabama turns rape victims into suspects, AL.com (Jun. 25, 2017),
https://www.al.com/opinion/2017/06/alabama_turns_rape_victims_int.html.
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No statistics exist on how frequently sexual assault occurs during the
first sexual contact between victim and accused because crime surveys and
researchers typically do not ask this question. 78 Nevertheless, First
Encounter sexual contact is likely the most common and yet unexplored
feature of the abundant sexual assault case law. 79 When considered
alongside the societal presumption of nonconsent, First Encounter sexual
assault has very important implications for improving the law’s
effectiveness by challenging us to consider how the presumption of
nonconsent was overcome.80
I use the term “First Encounter” to refer to any sexual contact that
occurs for the first time between the relevant parties. For example, if
nonconsensual sexual penetration is at issue, the conduct in question is a
First Encounter if the victim had never before experienced sexual
penetration with the accused, even if she engaged in kissing or other
intimate contact with him. Thus, the use of this terminology assumes that a
form of lesser sexual or intimate contact does not constitute consent to a
more serious form.
Some of the most discussed cases in criminal law are First Encounters,
and yet that feature is not usually part of the conversation.81 In State v.
Rusk, the victim agreed to give the defendant a ride home (at his request)
shortly after meeting him, for the first time, at a bar.82 Before she did so, she
78

Since 2001, the National Crime Victimization Survey has asked whether sexual
assault victims were attacked by someone unknown to them, a casual acquaintance, or
someone they knew well, but it does not ask whether the attack was the first instance of
sexual contact between those involved. NCVS Basic Screen Questionnaire, 2001-2019,
National Crime Victimization Survey, Bureau of Justice Statistics, https://bjs.ojp.gov/datacollection/ncvs#surveys-0 (last visited Sep. 8, 2021).
79
Every sexual assault case described in this article is a First Encounter, giving the
reader a robust sense of how common these cases are. However, it is also likely that sexual
assault in ongoing sexual relationships is even less likely to be reported to police, which
could distort our perceptions of how common such sexual assault is. My thanks to
Deborah Tuerkheimer for sharing this observation.
80
This is not to suggest that all sexual assault includes this dynamic. Certainly many
sexual assaults occur in the context of an ongoing relationship, and often such relationships
feature multiple sexual assaults as well as other forms of violence. My focus here,
however, is on the numerous cases that involve the first instance of sexual contact between
victim and accused.
81
Rusk, Berkowitz, and M.T.S., discussed here, are all frequently included in criminal
law casebooks. See, e.g. ASHDOWN, BACIGAL, & GERSHOWITZ, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES
AND COMMENTS (10th ed. 2017); DRESSLER AND GARVEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CRIMINAL LAW (8th ed. 2019); JOSEPH E. KENNEDY, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES,
CONTROVERSIES AND PROBLEMS (1st ed. 2019); LEE & HARRIS, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2019); ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 2020).
82
Rusk v. State, 424 A.2d 720, 721 (Md. 1981).
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made it clear that she was not at all interested in sex.83 The defendant then
coerced her into coming up to his apartment by taking her car keys, caused
her to fear for her life by choking her, and then raped her. 84 In
Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, the victim, a college student, went to the
accused’s dorm room while she was looking for his roommate; the
defendant then initiated a sexual encounter that resulted in a rape
complaint. 85 Victim and accused were known to one another and the
accused claimed that they had flirted, but they had no prior sexual contact.86
In New Jersey’s pivotal case State in the Interest of M.T.S., victim and
accused had lived in the same house for a period of time, but there was no
evidence of prior sexual contact. 87 That all of these cases involved First
Encounters is not addressed in the respective opinions.
Additionally, each of the cases discussed in this Article supra feature
First Encounter dynamics. The victim in Devoy, the 1904 Wisconsin case,
had just met one of the perpetrators at a dance while his co-conspirator was
a stranger to her.88 Futamata’s victim was an acquaintance from the YMCA,
but they had never spoken.89 Iniguez’s victim had just met him the evening
before her wedding.90 Megan Rondini knew her assailant from around town
but had never had sexual contact with him.91 These cases illustrate that the
First Encounter dynamic is easy to spot across decades of case law.92 In

83

Id.
Id. at 721, 722.
85
Com. v. Berkowtiz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 1994). Berkowitz’s rape conviction
was reversed because, although the penetration occurred without the victim’s consent, the
court found an absence of forcible compulsion. Id. at 1165, 1166. His indecent assault
conviction was affirmed because that crime required a lack of consent but no force. Id. at
1166. Subsequently, Pennsylvania criminalized sexual penetration without consent and
without force. PA. CONS. STAT. §3124.1. (“Except as provided in §3121 (relating to rape)
or § 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual intercourse), a person commits a felony of
the second degree when that person engages in sexual intercourse or deviate sexual
intercourse with a complainant without the complainant's consent.”)
86
Com. v. Berkowtiz, 609 A.2d at 1341.
87
State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1267, 1268 (N.J. 1992). In M.T.S., the New
Jersey supreme court held that the only force required under the rape statute was the force
inherent in the sexual act. Id. at 1277.
88
Devoy, 99 N.W. at 455. See notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
89
Futamata, 343 P.2d at 1059. See notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
90
Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1184. See notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
91
Katie Baker, A College Student Accused A Powerful Man Of Rape. Then She Became A
Suspect, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jun. 22, 2017).
92
As another example, Deborah Tuerkheimer analyzed nine sexual assault cases in
Rape On and Off Campus. Six of these were First Encounters involving adult victims. Of
the three cases involving juvenile victims, two were not First Encounters because they
involved fathers who repeatedly molested their daughters. The third involved a sixteen84
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other words, this method of sexual assault remains effective and does not
get old, so long as courts ignore it.
That sexual assault very often arises in a context where the alleged
assault is the first-ever sexual contact between victim and accused presents
an opportunity for investigators to move past the perception that many cases
simply boil down to “he said, she said.” Investigators often get stuck in this
perceptual rut because of a failure to fully investigate. This is where
framing the law to recognize the significance of First Encounter dynamics
can help. Many First Encounter sexual assaults feature sexually aggressive
behavior between people who have recently met or who have no prior
sexual contact. In such cases, the presumption of nonconsent to sexual
contact has never before been mutually set aside, and yet the perpetrator
makes little or no effort to seek the victim’s consent before initiating sexual
contact. The victim is caught off guard as a result, responding with shock or
fear that impedes her or his ability to react.
The presumption of nonconsent that precedes many sexual assaults is
evident in the case law in other ways as well. There are numerous fact
patterns where the parties share a definition of the situation as one that is
explicitly nonsexual, such as the relationship between a parent and child, a
doctor and patient, or a youth pastor and teenage congregant.93 The assailant
violates the victim’s trust by touching her sexually without warning and
without seeking consent. In such cases, the presumption of nonconsent is
overcome unilaterally rather than mutually.
These dynamics fuel a cycle of sexual violence, with perpetrators
repeatedly committing First Encounter sexual assault, surprising and
traumatizing victim after victim, while courts fail to hold perpetrators
accountable. Why? Because existing legal frameworks neither recognize the
societal presumption of nonconsent nor the significance of First Encounter
sexual assault. The solution is statutory reform that focuses the analytical
lens squarely on these critical but overlooked dynamics. Before turning to
that proposal, the next subsection further clarifies the problems of
presuming consent.
E. Problematizing the Presumption of Consent
The presumption that people consent to sex unless they resist is highly
problematic for several reasons. There are problems pertaining to sexual
agency, victims’ reactions to sexual assault, and equal protection. This
subsection addresses each of these concepts in turn.
year-old victim experiencing second encounter sexual contact with the perpetrator. See
generally Tuerkheimer, supra note 19.
93
See notes 174-80 & 186-92 and accompanying text.
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1. The Sexual Agency Problem
When courts presume consent, they presume sexual availability. And in
doing so, they rob people of sexual agency—their power and prerogative to
make their own choices about when and how to be sexually active, and with
whom.94 The presumption that people, particularly women, are perpetually
available for sexual purposes, at any time and with any partner, is at odds
with how most people understand their own sexual relationships and sexual
access to others.95
As we have seen, the consent presumption stands in direct contradiction
to societal social norms which presume the opposite. Law-abiding
individuals do not assume that everyone around them is sexually available
to them; rather, they look for clear signs of consent before proceeding with
sexual contact. And they do so because respect for the sexual agency of
others requires this course of action. Courts effectively ignore sexual
agency and presume that consent is present in the absence of resistance,
whether verbal or physical.
This presumption places victims of sexual assault at a disadvantage,
requiring them to physically resist or state their objection. Courts’
presumption of consent also enables and endorses sexually predatory
behavior by giving assailants the benefit of an assumption that society does
not extend to them outside the courtroom. Anything a sexually aggressive
person does is fine as long as the victim does not voice an objection. The
lesson for the predator is to act in such a way as to accomplish his purpose
before the victim can say anything—whether due to speed, surprise, or
some other factor.96 As Professor Anderson observes, both the common
94

Many scholars use the term “sexual autonomy” to describe an individual’s right to
decide what kind of sexual activities she wishes to pursue with other willing participants as
well as the ability to avoid sexual activities that she prefers to avoid. See, e.g.
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 37 at 99. Others have argued for the term
“sexual agency,” rather than autonomy, as a corrective to some of the limitations of the
latter term, in particular its failure to take into account the social context and power
inequalities within which women make decisions about their sexuality. As Tuerkheimer
puts it, “agency better contemplates the complicated, power-infused dynamics that
surround sexual relations.” Tuerkheimer, Sexual Agency, supra note 14 at 169-70. For a
fuller discussion, see id. and Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist
Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805 (1999).
95
As noted supra, Schulhofer argues that it is simply not the case that people are
always receptive to sexual intercourse, at any time, and with any person, “until they do
something to revoke that permission.” Schulhofer, Reforming, supra note 21 at 345.
96
See Tuerkheimer, Rape On and Off Campus, supra note 26 at 33-38 for further
discussion of the role of the dynamics of trust and surprise in sexual assault cases involving
nonconsent but no use of force.
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law and the No Model “[r]eward willful blindness… Unless his partner
verbally objects, a man who deliberately avoids guilty knowledge by quietly
and quickly penetrating a woman he is passionately kissing is a man who
has his partner’s consent.”97
Another aspect of sexual agency is the ability to select one’s sexual
partner(s). 98 When courts presume consent, they assume that a person is
equally available to anyone who comes calling, effectively erasing the
person’s prerogative to choose. This problem is clearly illustrated in
Futamata, where the victim was abducted as she walked between her
outhouse and her home in the middle of the night.99 The court assumed that
she was sexually available at this particular time, place, and with this
partner. The court’s erasure of her right to choose is startling.
2. The Frozen in Fear Problem
The expectation that people who do not want sexual contact will clearly
express their objection is most problematic in relation to the numerous cases
where the victim finds himself unable to articulate his lack of consent and
thus appears passive. This includes cases where the victim is affected by the
surprise or shock of the assault, where she finds herself frozen in fear and
unable to respond, and where she is afraid of what the perpetrator will do to
her if she says “no.”100
There is a large body of literature on trauma and neurobiology which
has found that victims of sexual assault often experience tonic immobility—
an inability to move and respond to the assault.101 Moreover, case law is
97

Anderson, supra note 17 at 1420.
SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX supra note 37 at 99, 111. Schulhofer makes this
argument in relation to sexual autonomy, but it applies equally to sexual agency.
99
People v. Futamata, 343 P.2d 1058, 1059 (Colo. 1959).
100
I do not include, in this category, cases where the victim does not express her lack
of consent due to intoxication, sleep, or some other form of incapacity, because statutes
often have distinct statutory provisions addressing these situations.
101
KIMBERLY A. LONSWAY & JOANNE ARCHAMBAULT, END VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
INT’L., VICTIM IMPACT: HOW VICTIMS ARE AFFECTED BY SEXUAL ASSAULT AND HOW
LAW ENFORCEMENT CAN RESPOND 12 (2020) (“Frozen fright and dissociation are very
common experiences of sexual assault victims”); Jim Hopper, “Reflexes and Habits” Is
Much Better Than “Fight or Flight”, JIMHOPPER.COM 3 (Feb. 12, 2021),
https://www.jimhopper.com/pdf/hopper_2021_reflexes_and_habits.pdf. (“One of the
extreme survival reflexes [is] tonic immobility, in which the body is literally paralyzed and
muscles are rigid….”; Anna Möller et al., Tonic immobility during sexual assault – a
common reaction predicting post-traumatic stress disorder and severe depression, 96
ACTA OBSTETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA SCANDINAVICA 932, 935 (2017),
https://obgyn.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/aogs.13174 (“The major finding of the
present study was that the experience of TI during sexual assault is common”);
98
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filled with abundant examples of victims who reported that they froze in
response to being sexually assaulted and as a result did not offer any
meaningful resistance, whether verbal or physical, to the perpetrator.102 That
victims so frequently respond to sexual assault with a “frozen in fear”
reaction is critically important in understanding the need for statutory
reform. 103
It is simply not the case that all people who are the targets of sexually
aggressive individuals have the ability, in the moment, to clearly express
their lack of consent. They may find themselves immobilized, terrified, or
too surprised to react quickly enough. They may be afraid that the
perpetrator will harm them if they resist, and they may also be unable to
fully articulate this fear to a court. For all of these reasons, courts’ tendency
to presume consent to sex in the absence of a clear contrary indication
results in the under-criminalization of sexual assault and the enabling of
sexually predatory conduct.
3. The Equal Protection Problem
The presumption of consent is also problematic because it
disproportionately impacts females. Females make up the majority of sexual
assault victims, and they generally are sexually assaulted by males.104 As
such, the law’s presumption of consent promotes gender bias in that it
assumes that females, more often than males, are sexually available to any
102

See, e.g., Bondi v. Commonwealth, 824 S.E.2d 512, 517-18 (Va. Ct. App. 2019)
(victim reporting “[c]omplete paraly[sis]”); State v. Rowland, 528 S.W.3d 449, 452 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2017)(victim “couldn’t escape” and “froze in fear”); State v. Janis, 880 N.W.2d
76, 78 (S.D. 2016)(victim was “frozen”); State v. Stevens, 53 P.3d 356 (Mont. 2002)
(victim’s “mind and body were frozen”); Suarez v. State, 901 S.W.2d 712, 719 (Tex. App.
1995) (victim stated she “just froze”); People v. Smolen, 564 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (1990)
(victim was “frozen in fear”); State v. Bohannon, 526 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975)(victim “froze” when defendant seized her); Rush v. State, 301 So.2d 297, 298 (Miss.
1974)(victim was “frozen” and “paralyzed”).
103
Some members of the ABA have criticized the notion that being frozen in fear is a
common reaction to sexual assault, but the frequency with which this reaction is found
across decades of case law discounts that critique. See Robert M. Carlson, American Bar
Ass’n. Letter re ABA Proposed Resolution 114, (Aug. 8, 2019) (signed by numerous
members of the ABA).
104
Sexual Violence is Preventable, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/injury/features/sexualviolence/index.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2021) (“Anyone can experience [sexual
violence], but most victims are female”); PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L
INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF RAPE
VICTIMIZATION: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 1, iii
(2006), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/210346.pdf (“[M]ost rape victims are female
(almost 86 percent), and most rapists are male”).
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person who wants them—a presumption that is especially problematic given
how widespread First Encounter sexual assault is. The result is the enabling
of sexually predatory behavior and the underenforcement of laws against
sexual assault.105
This section has argued that a legal presumption of consent is
incompatible with the presumption of nonconsent which operates in the real
world. As Professor Schulhofer notes,
“[t]he premise of a consent requirement is that individuals do
not want to be sexually penetrated unless and until they
indicate that they do. Across the wide range of situations in
which acquaintances and strangers encounter one another—on
the street, at work, in parks, at parties, on dates—a presumption
of disinterest in sexual intimacy is accurate much more often
than a presumption that both individuals want to have
intercourse with each other. And as a matter of first principles,
it is more appropriate to assume that each individual prefers
bodily privacy until he or she indicates otherwise.”106
This contradiction between real-life and legal presumptions may explain
why so many victims are shocked, enraged, and even suicidal upon learning
that the law does not perceive what was done to them to be rape.107 The law
105
Professor Tuerkheimer has argued that gender-based underenforcement of the law
is a cognizable harm. See generally Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal
Protection, 57 B.C.L. REV. 1287 (2016). As an example, Tuerkheimer notes that the federal
investigation into rape investigation failures in Missoula, Montana was groundbreaking
because it was “premised on an understanding of gender-based under-policing as an equal
protection violation; one demanding a federal response.” Id. at 1324. For further discussion
of the Missoula example, see notes 200-212 and accompanying text.
106
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Consent: What it Means and Why It’s Time to Require It; 47
U. Pac. L. Rev. 665, 670 (2016) (hereinafter “Consent”).
107
It is well-established that victims of sexual assault are at higher risk of suicide than
the general population. Although I am not aware of any research that parses out what role
being disbelieved, accused of false reporting, or otherwise suffering ill treatment at the
hands of law enforcement plays in suicide decisions, it would not be surprising if a
connection exists. Megan Rondini indicated on a mental health intake form, prior to her
suicide, that she had been raped and then “bullied by police.” Baker, supra note 91. On the
link between suicide and sexual assault, see Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAINN,
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/victims-sexual-violence (last visited Sep. 7, 2021) (the
incidence of “suicidal or depressive thoughts increases after sexual violence;” “33% of
women who are raped contemplate suicide,” and “13% of women who are raped attempt
suicide.”. See also Suicide Prevention: Fast Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/suicide/facts/ (last visited July 24, 2021); Edward C.
Chang et al., Hope Under Assault: Understanding the Impact of Sexual Assault on the
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must change to recognize the same presumption operative in society at
large—a presumption of nonconsent.
PART TWO: A PROPOSAL FOR STATUTORY REFORM: SEEKING CONSENT
This section first illustrates the value of presuming nonconsent rape
adjudication applying the new standard to existing caselaw. It will then
reveal a statutory reform proposal framed around a “seeking consent”
standard. Part Three will then demonstrate that the proposed standard has
the potential to be a powerful tool across a range of First Encounter cases.
A. Recognizing the Presumption of Nonconsent in First Encounter Sex
The violation of sexual agency that occurs in First Encounter sexual
assault is particularly distinctive, because the presumption of nonconsent is
intact leading up to that moment of first sexual contact between the actors in
question. The lawfulness of any ensuing sexual contact should thus turn on
how the presumption of nonconsent was abandoned. Did the parties make a
mutual decision to set aside the presumption, or did the perpetrator make
this decision unilaterally, either by failing to consult the victim, or ignoring
her wishes? 108 The law should focus on this process, probing all of the
circumstances in order to discern whether the presumption of nonconsent
was overcome unilaterally or by mutual agreement.
Therefore, the relevant inquiry in a First Encounter sexual assault case
is whether the perpetrator sought the victim’s consent prior to engaging in
sexual penetration or contact with her. This question can be evaluated by
examining the perpetrator’s actions or words in seeking consent, rather than
the victim’s actions in giving it. The value in this approach is its recognition
that the societal presumption of nonconsent is present between parties who
have never before shared sexual contact, and that the operative task is to
analyze whether that presumption was lawfully overcome.
A focus on the perpetrator’s actions in seeking consent eliminates the
obsolete practice of determining whether a sexual assault occurred by
assessing the victim’s response. Her level of resistance or fear no longer
matter, because the court is squarely focused on what the perpetrator did.
Relation between Hope and Suicidal Risk in College Students, 34 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 221, 223 (2015).
108
For instance, in Berkowtiz, the accused said, after the encounter, “I guess we got
carried away.” The victim replied, “No…you got carried away.” Berkowtiz, 609 A.2d at
1340. Her comment is evidence of a unilateral abandonment of the presumption of
nonconsent.
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This is where the attention should be, because the wrong of sexual assault
does not depend on how much the victim resisted or how afraid she was.
The wrong of sexual assault lies in the perpetrator’s violation of the
victim’s sexual agency—her right to make her own decisions about her
sexuality, including when and with whom to share it.
People v. Warren illustrates. In this Illinois case, the victim had been
cycling in a natural area when the perpetrator found her standing alone
enjoying a scenic overlook. 109 He approached her and engaged her in
conversation, but when she turned to leave, he refused to let her go, saying
“This will only take a minute. My girlfriend doesn’t meet my needs,” and “I
don’t want to hurt you.” 110 He then picked her up, carried her into the
woods, and sexually assaulted her.111 At a bench trial the defendant was
convicted of two counts of deviate sexual assault and was sentenced to six
years in prison.112
But the Illinois court of appeals overturned his conviction, finding a
lack of force or threat of force.113 They reached this conclusion despite the
size difference between the parties—he was eighty pounds heavier and
thirteen inches taller than she was—and despite his behavior.114 Indeed, the
court stated, “[a]side from picking up complainant and carrying her into and
out of the woods, defendant did not employ his superior size and
strength.” 115 The victim testified that she did not resist or call for help
because of her “overwhelming fear,” but the court only saw consent in her
terror.116 The opinion faulted her for failing to resist, as resistance was a
requirement of Illinois law when the case was decided.117 “[C]omplainant’s
failure to resist when it was within her power to do so conveys the
impression of consent regardless of her mental state, amounts to consent
and removes from the act performed an essential element of the crime.”118
For unexplained reasons, the opinion does find anything wrong with an
accused picking up the victim, whom he had just met, and carrying her to
the site of the assault. Surely this is force. It is also coercion; adults do not
normally carry one another. But the law does not capture the fundamental
wrong of the defendant’s conduct here—it was not the use of force to
accomplish his purpose, but rather the violation of his victim’s sexual
109

People v. Warren, 446 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
Id. at 592.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 591.
113
Id. at 594.
114
Id. at 593.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 594.
118
Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
110

25
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4191840

26

SEX AND NONCONSENT

[VOL

agency. This violation terrified her. Illinois law no longer requires
resistance, but it does require the use of force or threat of force. 119
Accordingly, it does not recognize the violation of sexual agency absent
force or threat of force.
If the court was instead tasked with preserving sexual agency by
analyzing the perpetrator’s actions in seeking consent, the result would be
very different. Warren was a first encounter case featuring a victim and
defendant who had just met each other and were engaging in casual
conversation. As such, there was a presumption of nonconsent to sexual
contact present in this situation. The perpetrator had no basis for believing
that the victim was open to sexual contact after a few minutes’
conversation. The victim’s conduct in attempting to leave the interaction is
further evidence that the presumption of nonconsent remained in effect,
since leaving is the opposite of what one would do if one was consenting to
sexual contact. At this point, the defendant made statements that hinted at
his desire for sex but did not state that desire explicitly. Then, without
waiting for any response from the victim, he used his greater size and
strength to pick her up and carry her to a more secluded location.
Under a seeking consent standard, the court would begin by recognizing
the presumption against sexual contact and would note that the victim’s
actions in attempting to leave reinforced that presumption. The court would
then note that not only did the perpetrator fail to make his desire for sex
unambiguously clear to the victim, he did not give her the opportunity to
respond to his request. He impeded her effort to leave and he then picked
her up and carried her to a more secluded location. His actions were a
violation of her sexual agency. His conviction should have been affirmed.
The advantage of the seeking consent standard over the Yes Model is
the focus on the perpetrator’s actions of failing to seek consent rather than
the victim’s actions in freezing or walking away. The law should focus, as it
does in most other crimes, on the accused’s actions; framing the law in this
way sends an important message to perpetrators about how they are
expected to conform their conduct to the normative standards.
B. Toward a Better Normative Standard—Seeking Consent
I have argued that a presumption of nonconsent exists in relationships
where the parties have not experienced prior consensual sexual contact, and
that First Encounter sexual assault complaints therefore merit particular
scrutiny of whether that presumption was overcome mutually or
unilaterally. The law must recognize the presumption of nonconsent and
119

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN § 5/11.1.20(a)(1)(West 2021).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4191840

DATE]

SEX AND NONCONSENT

27

hold perpetrators accountable for breaching it without seeking and obtaining
consent. As Professor Schulhofer points out, “[e]ven without making threats
that restrict the exercise of free choice, an individual violates a woman’s
autonomy when he engages in sexual conduct without ensuring that he has
her valid consent.” 120 I therefore propose an offense of committing firsttime sexual penetration or contact without seeking consent.
This “Seeking Consent” approach bears some similarity to the
affirmative consent Yes Model. But whereas the typical affirmative consent
statute looks to the actions of the victim in giving consent, as we shall see in
Part Four, the seeking consent approach focuses on analyzing the actions of
the perpetrator. The inquiry is concerned with the overall context in which
seeking consent occurred and whether it was conducive to a free and
voluntary agreement on the part of the victim. In particular, did the
defendant’s words and actions make clear to the victim his intent to seek
sexual contact? And did his words and actions evince a willingness to wait
for and to respect the decision of the victim? If people are to conform their
conduct to legal expectations, they need to know what those requirements
are. Sending the message that the law will analyze a sex initiator’s conduct
in seeking consent is a clearer message than having the law analyze the
victim’s actions.
The Seeking Consent approach also bears some similarity to Professor
Michelle Anderson’s proposed negotiation model, which requires the sex
initiator to “negotiate with his or her partner and thereby come to an
agreement that sexual penetration should occur.” 121 Anderson recognizes
the distinctiveness of First Encounter sexual contact and would require the
negotiation to be verbal in such cases:122
“It is important to note that the risk for sexual assault is highest
for people engaging in sexual penetration for the first
time….Therefore, the imperative of verbal negotiation for
penetration is all the more powerful in newer relationships.”123
Anderson would only apply the model to penetrative acts, but she
argues that negotiation should include a discussion of “each person’s

120

SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX supra note 37 at 111.
Michelle Anderson, Negotiating Sex, supra note 17 at 1423.
122
Id. at 1425. Anderson takes the view that “ [r]elying on body language creates too
many possibilities for mistake and is therefore ethically inadequate…. Particularly when
people are engaging in sexual penetration for the first time, verbal discourse is a necessity.”
Id.
123
Id. at 1426.
121

27
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4191840

28

SEX AND NONCONSENT

[VOL

desires and limitations.” 124 In contrast, the Seeking Consent approach is
more narrowly focused on whether the sex initiator had consent for the
specific acts that the complainant later objects to, which should make it
easier to implement. This approach also recognizes that seeking consent can
occur through actions as well as words, and should apply to any form of
sexual contact, since many people avoid sharing such contact with more
than a few others.125
The Seeking Consent approach can be codified into law using a threephase approach. The first is for the statutory framework to define sex crimes
in terms of nonconsent alone rather than the presence of force. Just over half
of American jurisdictions have already adopted this approach in relation to
sexual penetration. 126 It is the preferable approach because restricting
criminal sexual assault to situations involving force or fear does not capture
the wide range of nonconsensual sexual contact that society finds offensive.
The law should criminalize knowing, nonconsensual sexual contact,
whether or not force or fear is present.127
An example of this approach is the Montana statute specifying that “[a]
person who knowingly has sexual intercourse with another person without
consent or with another person who is incapable of consent commits the
offense of sexual intercourse without consent.”128 Montana prohibits other
forms of nonconsensual sexual contact with similar language. 129 This
approach is simple, clear and captures the wide range of offensive sexual
contact that occurs.
The second phase is to define consent in affirmative terms—the Yes
Model. Montana, like several other states, does so by indicating that “[t]he
124

Id. at 1422.
I do not share Anderson’s concern that nonverbal communication is inadequate
when it comes to seeking consent, but she makes a compelling argument grounded in
studies demonstrating the tendency of men to misinterpret women’s body language and to
see sexual consent “where there is none.” Id. at 1417.
126
Schulhofer, Reforming, supra note 21 at 343 (“[i]n a majority of states it is finally
true that nonconsent alone suffices”). For a fuller discussion of force and consent in current
statutes, see id. at 342-44.
127
For a full explication of this argument, see Schulhofer, Consent, supra note 100 at
669-71. Several states already using a consent standard recognize offenses involving sexual
acts or contact in addition to sexual penetration, and they typically define the former terms.
See, e.g. ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 11.41.410(a)(1), 11.41.420(a)(1), 11.41.470(6)(West
2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1404(A), 13-1406(A), 13-1401(3)(West 2021); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-318(5), 28-319(1), 28-320(1)(West 2021); VT. STAT. ANN. §§
3251(1), 3252(a)(West 2021).
128
MONT. CODE ANN § 45-5-503(1). Montana’s statutes also define an offense of
“aggravated sexual intercourse without consent,” which includes the use of force. MONT.
CODE ANN § 45-5-508.
129
MONT. CODE ANN § 45-5-502(1).
125
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term ‘consent’ means words or overt actions indicating a freely given
agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”130 This definition
of affirmative consent captures the need for affirmative words or actions,
but it has the limitation of defining the offense in terms of the victim’s
behavior rather than the accused’s.
This is why a third phase is necessary—the creation of an offense of
engaging in first-time sexual penetration or contact without seeking consent.
This offense would focus scrutiny on the conduct of the perpetrator in
seeking the victim’s consent to First Encounter sexual contact—an
approach that is desirable because the criminal nature of the act should
depend on the perpetrator’s actions, not on the victim’s response. This
approach also requires the court to scrutinize First Encounter sexual contact
and to recognize the presumption of nonconsent that precedes it.
A person commits the offense of “intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly engaging in first-time sexual penetration/contact without seeking
consent” when he engages in sexual penetration or contact without seeking
consent from the other person. I would define “seeking consent” to mean
(a) indicating, through words or actions, a person’s intent to engage in
sexual contact/penetration with another person and then (b) waiting until
consent has been granted before initiating that contact/penetration. Seeking
consent does not occur where the sexual contact/penetration happens before
the other person has given consent, or where circumstances of physical or
mental coercion prevent freely given consent.
This definition of “seeking consent” requires courts to perform a twopart analysis when analyzing the defendant’s culpability with respect to
seeking consent. First, the court analyzes how the defendant expressed his
desire for sexual contact. What words or actions did he use to indicate an
intent to engage in sexual contact, and would the victim understand these
words or actions to indicate a desire for sexual contact?
Second, the “waiting” portion of the definition requires the court to
consider two factors in the consent-seeking process—a time factor and a
space factor. This is because the case law reveals that sexual assault
perpetrators often use time and space to their advantage and to the victim’s
detriment.131 For instance, they often introduce sexual contact quickly and
unexpectedly, before the victim has a chance to grasp what is happening, let
alone choose how to respond. Perpetrators also often make sexual demands
while invading the victim’s personal space. Case law reveals scenarios
where the victim realized the perpetrator’s sexual objectives at the moment

130
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Id. at (1)(a).
See notes 140-199 and accompanying text.
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his hand went down her pants or up her shirt, or she woke up to the
sensation of unexpected sexual touching.132
The time analysis considers whether the perpetrator respected the time
that the victim needed to respond meaningfully to his overture before the
sexual contact began. Did the victim have a realistic opportunity to think
about the implications of having sexual contact at that moment, consider
whether he wanted to do so, and stop the interaction, if he so desired? Or
did the defendant proceed so quickly that the victim had no chance to think,
let alone respond?
The space analysis is about whether the defendant respected the victim’s
physical space in such a way that she could make a meaningful choice. Did
the victim have the physical space to decline the defendant’s advances? If
the defendant was on top of her, had his hands around her neck or in her
pants, had hold of her arm, or was otherwise using his physical presence to
coerce or intimidate her into agreement, then she may not have had the
necessary physical space to make an uncoerced decision. The relative size,
strength, and ability levels of the parties is relevant to this analysis. If the
accused was capable of overpowering the victim, his presence may have
been intimidating to her even if he was not touching her.
The offense of “knowingly engaging in first-time sexual
penetration/contact without seeking consent” can thus be broken down into
the elements of (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (2) engaging in
sexual penetration or contact, (3) with a particular person for the first time,
(4) without seeking consent, where “seeking consent” means (a) clearly and
unambiguously expressing his intent to engage in sexual contact and (b)
waiting until the victim has granted consent prior to proceeding. Courts
would analyze both the time and the physical space dynamics of the
situation in determining whether the defendant had waited for the victim’s
response.
It should be apparent that the victim’s actual consent is not an element
of the crime; this proposed offense focuses on the accused’s conduct in
seeking consent. The victim’s actions are not analyzed because the victim is
not on trial and has no obligation to indicate her desire to be left alone.
Focusing the analysis on the accused is what “force” statutes do—they were
designed to assess the conduct of the accused, not the victim. 133 But
whereas using force to define sex crimes under-criminalizes sexual assault
by failing to capture all offensive, nonconsensual sexual contact, the
seeking consent approach casts an appropriately wider net by criminalizing
132

See, e.g. People v. Carlson, 663 N.E.2d. 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); People v. Iniguez,
872 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1994); State v. Janis, 880 N.W.2d 76 (S.D. 2016); State v. Herzog, 610
P.2d 1281, 1282 (Utah 1980).
133
ESTRICH, supra note 17 at 57-62.
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all sexual contact that occurs in a First Encounter context where the
perpetrator does not first seek consent.
The crime is fulfilled if the accused proceeds with first-time sexual
contact without taking appropriate steps to seek consent. Consent is
therefore available to the perpetrator as an affirmative defense, allowing the
defendant to argue that he did not seek consent because it was already
present. He would then have to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
the presence of consent using an affirmative consent standard. That is, that
the victim clearly and unambiguously expressed his or her consent through
words or actions.134 Additionally, jurisdictions should retain an offense of
engaging in “sexual intercourse/contact without consent” in order to
adjudicate sexual assault beyond the First Encounter context. Existing law
would also be relevant to assaults where the defendant did seek consent but
is accused of sexual assault without consent, such as where the victim
withdrew consent.
The chief advantages of the seeking consent offense I have proposed is
that it recognizes that consent to sex is not continuously present in human
relationships absent some affirmative indication, and it focuses the analysis
on the perpetrator’s actions. These measures introduce a degree of fairness
that has been missing from rape law for decades.
PART THREE: THE SEEKING CONSENT APPROACH IN ACTION
This section applies the seeking consent standard to a range of sexual
assault cases and shows how it produces more just outcomes. Each of the
cases discussed involves a First Encounter and a presumption of nonconsent
that should have been recognized by the courts—dynamics overlooked
when the cases were decided. These cases, taken together, demonstrate that
First Encounter dynamics are ubiquitous in sexual assault cases and that the
law has overlooked the usefulness of this analytical category and the
accompanying presumption of nonconsent.
This section analyzes five categories of cases: (a) brief encounters
where the perpetrator failed to seek to consent; (b) brief encounters where
the perpetrator unilaterally shifted the dynamic from nonsexual to sexual;
(c) cases where a First Encounter sexual assault occurred in the context of a
relationship clearly defined as nonsexual; (d) cases involving college-age

134

Vandervort describes a similar framework in Canada, where the defense of “belief
in consent” is available to the accused, but only if he can “point to specific words or actions
by the complainant which communicated agreement to the activity in question, with him, at
the time in question.” Vandervort, supra note 16 at 402.
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predators and victims; and (e) worst case scenarios involving serial
predators who exploit First Encounter dynamics.
In many of these cases, the perpetrator’s conviction was affirmed. But
in each case, the seeking consent standard would have provided a fairer and
more straightforward approach to analyzing the wrong of the sexual
assault—the interference with the victim’s sexual agency. Thus, this
approach places respect for the victim’s sexual agency at the forefront of the
analysis.
A. The Brief Encounter
As we saw in Devoy, Neil and Warren, First Encounter sexual assault
cases often feature sexually aggressive behavior between a perpetrator and a
victim whom he has recently met.135 The term “Brief Encounter” has been
coined to describe cases where victim and assailant are recent
acquaintances—often having met within the twenty-four hours prior to the
assault –and have no prior sexual contact. 136 The term thus describes a
subset of First Encounter cases—those where the sexual assault occurs
within hours, or even minutes, of the parties’ meeting one another for the
first time. Sexual assault in the Brief Encounter context is extremely
common, and sexual assault advocacy organizations are increasingly
drawing attention to the Brief Encounter dynamic in sexual assault.137 It is

135

text.

See notes 25-32 (Devoy), 53-56 (Neil), and 103-12 (Warren) and accompanying
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See, e.g., Aequitas, Model Response to Sexual Violence for Prosecutors (RSVP
Model) 72
(2020),
https://aequitasresource.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/RSVPAppendices-1.9.20.pdf (describing brief encounter as “met and assaulted within 24 hours”);
Elisabeth Olds, The Metropolitan Police Department’s Implementation of The Sexual
Assault Victim’s Rights Amendment Act of 2014 (SAVRAA) 16 (2015),
https://dccouncil.us/wpcontent/uploads/2018/budget_responses/ATTACHMENTGGeneralQuestions26SAVRAA.
pdf (describing a brief encounter as an assault committed by someone the survivor knows
only through meeting them on that occasion); Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne
Archambault, End Violence Against Women Int’l., Clearance Methods for Sexual Assault
Cases 48 (2020), https://evawintl.org/wp-content/uploads/Module-10_Clearance-MethodsModule-11.27.2020.pdf (describing a brief encounter as a situation in which the victim and
suspect knew each other for less than 24 hours); Sexual Assault Family Violence
Investigator
Course,
Grant
#
20700-12 89
(2020), https://www.wtamu.edu/_files/docs/sexual-assault-training (describing a brief
encounter as usually occurring within 24 hours after the perpetrator and victim meet).
137
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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often the case that the perpetrator exploits a dynamic of trust and surprises
the victim with unexpected sexual advances.138
The seeking consent legal framework can be particularly effective here
because the presumption of nonconsent is generally intact when people first
meet, and signals indicating that it is being mutually abandoned would have
to be particularly clear and unambiguous at this early stage of acquaintance.
People v. Carlson further illustrates the Brief Encounter dynamic and
demonstrates the effectiveness of the seeking consent approach to
prosecution. In Carlson, defendant and victim became acquainted for the
first time at a Chicago bar around St. Patrick’s Day, the victim having
arrived with her sister and a friend. 139 While at the bar, she and the
defendant struck up a conversation, and shortly thereafter they exited the
bar together to take a walk outside.140 The victim told her sister she would
return shortly.141Because it was raining, the perpetrator suggested they go
sit in his car, and the victim agreed.142 Once in the car, the defendant very
abruptly reclined the victim’s seat and began pulling off her clothes and
touching her sexually.143 The victim was shocked that her seat had suddenly
reclined, but before she could react, the defendant penetrated her vagina
with his fingers.144 When asked, during cross-examination, why she did not
exit the car, she responded:
“[T]hat she “laid there like a dead fish.” When asked by defense counsel
why she did not try to get out of the car, she stated, ‘I was frozen. I
didn’t know what to do. I was frozen. I couldn’t move. I was terrified.’
”145
The defendant’s conviction was upheld on appeal, but not before he
tried to argue that there was insufficient evidence of force. 146 Although this
defendant was held accountable for rape, the court relied in part on the
corroborating testimony of witnesses who testified about the victim’s
distress after the encounter.147
138

See Tuerkheimer, Rape On and Off Campus, supra note 26 at 33-38 for further
discussion of the role of the dynamics of trust and surprise in sexual assault cases involving
nonconsent but no use of force.
139
People v. Carlson, 663 N.E.2d. 32, 33 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
140
Id. at 33.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 34.
146
Id. at 35, 38.
147
Id. at 34, 38.
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The use of a seeking consent standard provides a more straightforward
approach to prosecution, relying on the perpetrator’s failure to seek consent
rather than on his use of force or the victim’s reaction to his conduct.
Because the parties had just met for the first time and had no history of prior
sexual contact, presuming nonconsent to sexual contact is the position
consistent with the parties’ relationship up to that point. Here, the
defendant’s actions reveal that he did not say or do anything to express his
desire for sexual contact. Moreover, the victim’s account suggests that she
got in the car because she trusted him and had no expectation that he would
move so quickly to touch her sexually. She further reported that he suddenly
reclined her seat, put his hands down her pants, and pawed her “in places
she did not want to be pawed.”148 Thus the defendant neither expressed his
intent to seek sexual contact nor waited for the victim’s response prior to
touching her.149
In addition, the time and space factors both favor culpability here. The
sexual contact occurred very quickly, within moments of the victim entering
the defendant’s car. The defendant also violated the victim’s personal
space; she testified that “he stuck his fingers in my vagina” and positioned
his body over her.150 Thus, even if the defendant asked for permission to
touch her sexually, she did not have a meaningful opportunity to decline
because his actions interfered with the time and space she needed.
A seeking consent standard first presumes that there was no consent to
sex between these recent acquaintances. It then focuses the analytical lens
on the perpetrator’s actions in seeking consent, finding that he failed to do
anything to obtain the victim’s consent prior to assaulting her. His
culpability would therefore be based on the proof that he made sexual
contact with the victim without seeking her consent. None of the victim’s
words or actions would be relevant, as they would be under the Yes Model.
Force and fear would be irrelevant. The defendant would be free to try to
prove the presence of consent as an affirmative defense, but the lack of any
indication of the victim’s clear and unambiguous agreement to sexual
contact would be fatal to that effort.
B. How Perpetrators Shift the Definition of the Situation in Brief
Encounters
In addition to failing to seek consent in the Brief Encounter context,
perpetrators also use a tactic of abruptly, and unilaterally, shifting the
148

Id. at 33.
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definition of the situation. 151 They first build trust with a victim in
circumstances where the parties share a common nonsexual definition of the
situation. But once the defendant has isolated the victim, he introduces
sexually aggressive behavior which his victim would not have anticipated
from his prior conduct, thereby violating the trust that originally lured the
victim into the interaction.
The seeking consent approach is designed to identify this pattern of
conduct by recognizing that sexual assaults often occur in situations where
there is no common definition of the situation as one that is potentially
sexual. Framing the legal inquiry around what the perpetrator did to seek
consent captures conduct where the perpetrator unilaterally introduces
sexual contact without the other person’s authorization. The next three cases
illustrate this dynamic in situations where the parties understood themselves
to be interacting in a context that had no sexual or romantic connotation.152
Although reasonable minds could differ widely on when a relationship is
intended to remain platonic, my intent here is simply to point out that
people do often have such expectations, and we would do well to include
them in discussions around sexual assault.153
In Arnold v. U.S., the defendant was found guilty of two Brief
Encounter rapes. 154 In both cases, he engaged the victim in platonic
conversation to the point that she felt comfortable entering his car. 155
Shortly thereafter, his demeanor became threatening, and he raped each
victim after threatening to kill her. 156 In Clark v. State, the defendant
offered a ride to a woman unknown to him who was waiting for a bus, on
her way to take her GED exam.157 Once she was in the car, he told her he
151

“Definition of the situation” is a sociological term describing the agreed upon, collective
understanding of what is happening in any given situation and the roles expected of each
participant. It can apply to any situation involving human interaction and explains how
individuals know how to conduct themselves, for instance, in the grocery store check out
line, when attending a movie, or going through airport security. See generally, Ashley
Crossman, Assessing a Situation, in Terms of Sociology THOUGHTCO.,
https://www.thoughtco.com/situation-definition-3026244 (last updated May 30, 2019).
152
Carlson and Herzog can be distinguished from Arnold, Clark, and Jones in the
sense that the former cases involved interactions that, in the eyes of most people, could
potentially have become sexual at some point. In contrast, there was no objectively
apparent romantic, sexual or intimate purpose to the interactions in Arnold, Clark, and
Jones.
153
For a related discussion on the harms of consensual but unwanted sex, see Robin
West, Sex, Law and Consent, GEORGETOWN LAW FACULTY WORKING PAPERS (Jul.
2008).
154
Arnold v. U.S., 358 A.2d 335, 336 (D.C. 1976).
155
Id. at 336-38.
156
Id. at 336; 337-38.
157
Clark v. State, 398 S.E.2d 377, 378 (Ga. App. 1990).
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needed to make a brief stop at his apartment; he then lured her inside by
claiming that someone in the apartment wanted to meet her. 158 He then
raped her. 159 In State v. Jones, a navy serviceman engaged in casual
conversation with a former roommate of his wife, after which he offered the
woman a ride to go see his wife.160 When the woman later requested a ride
home, he took her to his apartment on a pretext and raped her there.161
In each of these cases, the victim engaged in conduct with the defendant
based on a shared definition of the situation as something other than a
sexual encounter. Clark’s victim thought she was getting a ride to the GED
testing site; Arnold’s first victim believed that a neighborhood acquaintance
was giving her a ride to work, while his second victim had agreed to speak
to him on work-related matters.162 Jones’ victim thought he was taking her
to see an apartment for rent.163
A seeking consent standard would capture the unlawful conduct in each
of these cases without requiring proof of the victim’s fear, or of force used
against her, as the common law would require, and without analyzing the
victim’s conduct, as the Yes Model requires. Instead the analytical lens in
focused squarely on the perpetrator’s violation of trust and failure to seek
consent.164
C. First Encounter Sexual Assault in Manifestly Platonic Relationships
First Encounter cases often involve interpersonal dynamics where the
defendant and victim are interacting in situations that they mutually
understand to exclude sexual activity. Many strong relationships are built on
a foundation of trust which society recognizes as excluding sexual
contact—by design, and with an expectation that they will stay that way. In
such relationships, the possibility of consensual sexual contact is so remote
that justice requires giving the victim the benefit of the presumption of
nonconsent. Unfortunately, courts have often missed this.
When a perpetrator unilaterally introduces a sexual encounter into a
manifestly platonic relationship, the seeking consent standard addresses the
violation of the victim’s sexual agency. In such cases, the victim often does
not immediately respond to the violation due to shock or surprise.
158

Id. at 378.
Id.
160
State v. Jones, 617 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Haw. 1980).
161
Id. at 1216.
162
Arnold v. US, 358 A.2d at 335, 336-38.
163
State v. Jones, 617 P.2d at 1216.
164
These cases also demonstrate that fact-finders should give especially close scrutiny
to circumstances where the defendant isolates or seeks to control the victim by getting her
into a vehicle.
159
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These cases occur in a range of circumstances where roles, or status
differences between the parties, preclude sexual activity. Health care
professionals who violate provider-patient relationships are one example of
the latter. 165 The seeking consent standard is critical in such scenarios
because it recognizes and respects the decidedly nonsexual nature of the
relationship prior to the assault.
People v. Iniguez and State v. Janis provide examples.166 In Iniguez, a
bride was raped the night before her wedding by her “aunt’s” fiancé.167 The
aunt had made the victim’s wedding dress, and the victim slept at the aunt’s
home the night before the wedding. 168 They were joined by the aunt’s
fiancé, who had agreed to stand in for the victim’s father and walk her down
the aisle, but was meeting her for the first time that evening.169 The court
noted that there “was no flirtation or any remarks of a sexual nature”
between victim and defendant prior to the rape.170 Indeed, the victim was
focused on preparing for her wedding; she was shocked to wake up to find
her aunt’s fiancé sexually penetrating her.171
The defendant conceded that the victim did not consent to sexual
contact, but the California court of appeals reversed his conviction because
evidence of force or fear was insufficient.172 The California supreme court
reinstated his conviction, finding that the victim’s testimony—that she froze
and that she did not say or do anything because she was afraid the
perpetrator would become violent—to be sufficient evidence of fear.173
This victim found justice, but only after a four year wait.174 The delay
was the result of an awkward fit between the requirements of the law and
the nature of the wrong. The law allowed the defendant to challenge the jury
verdict on the basis that the victim did not exhibit fear. But the presence or
absence of the victim’s fear is not what made this sexual penetration a
crime; rather, it was the violation of the victim’s sexual agency. The
defendant stripped her of her agency in circumstances where she wanted no
sexual relationship with him and indeed trusted him to maintain a platonic
relationship with her. The existing law did not capture the true nature of the
wrong, but the seeking consent standard does. Her fear was irrelevant. Her
165
166

See notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1994); State v. Janis, 880 N.W.2d 76 (S.D.

2016).

167

The “aunt” was a close family friend. People v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d at 1184.
Id. at 1184.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 1185.
172
Id. at 1184.
173
Id. at 1188.
174
Id. at 1183-84.
168
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expectation that any interaction with the defendant would remain nonsexual
was relevant.
State v. Janis also involved a First Encounter sexual assault in close
proximity to a wedding; this time, it was the groom who raped the bride’s
maid of honor.175 He did so on his wedding night while the victim slept at
the couple’s home. 176 The evidence demonstrated that the victim was
sleeping in a spare room when the bride and groom arrived and was
awakened by someone penetrating her anally. 177 She testified to being
frozen during the assault, passing out, and then finding the groom in bed
with her the next morning.178 Janis is nearly identical to Iniguez in relation
to the defendant’s total inaction in seeking consent. The defendant joined
the victim in bed and penetrated her without warning; he simply ignored the
need to seek consent.179 The defendant was convicted of third degree rape
on the grounds that the victim was incapable of consent due to intoxication;
he claimed that she consented.180
Both of these cases would likely reach the same result under the Yes
Model because each victim said or did nothing to affirmatively indicate that
the perpetrator’s conduct was welcome. But the Seeking Consent approach
is a more straight forward way to arrive at that result by keeping the
analysis focused on the perpetrator’s actions rather than the victim’s. Each
perpetrator penetrated the victim without seeking her consent, and he did so
in a context where the social norms and expectations around marriage put
him on notice that the victim likely viewed the relationship as nonsexual
and expected it to remain so. Each victim likely relied on the presumption
of nonconsent when she fell asleep in a house where the perpetrator was
present.
Bondi v. Commonwealth provides another example of a First Encounter
sexual assault within an established relationship that was expressly
nonsexual. The victim, a college freshman, was sexually assaulted after
baby-sitting for her high school youth minister, whom she had known as a
mentor for several years. 181 When the defendant returned home on this
occasion, he told the victim “I love you like a daughter but I’m also in love
with you,” while touching her breasts and digitally penetrating her
vagina. 182 Here, the parties mutually understood their relationship to be
175

State v. Janis, 880 N.W.2d at 77-78.
Id. at 77-78.
177
Id. at 78.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Bondi v. Commonwealth, 824 S.E.2d 512, 514, 515 (Va. Ct. App. 2019).
182
Id. at 514, 515.
176
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nonsexual, and the victim relied on that understanding when she agreed to
babysit for the defendant. 183 The defendant unilaterally disrupted that
understanding. He placed a pillow on the victim’s lap and then laid down
with his head on the pillow—something he had never done before.184 He
then reached under the victim’s shirt, touched her breasts, then unzipped her
pants and digitally penetrated her vagina. 185 He engaged in all of these
actions without expressing his intentions to the victim and without waiting
for any response from her before initiating sexual contact.186
Although the defendant’s conviction was upheld under a force standard,
with the court finding sufficient force because the defendant grabbed the
victim’s arm in order to prevent her from leaving, 187 a seeking consent
standard more accurately captures the wrong—the violation of the victim’s
sexual agency. The defendant touched the victim sexually without seeking
her consent and knowing that she understood their relationship to be
nonsexual. His use of force was beside the point. The same result could be
reached under the Yes Model, because the victim froze and gave no
indication that the perpetrator’s actions were welcome. But the seeking
consent approach reaches this result solely through analysis of the
perpetrator’s proactive conduct rather than the victim’s reactive response.
A presumption that a relationship is nonsexual is also critical to a wide
range of professional relationships, such as those between health care
providers and their patients. There are numerous First Encounter sexual
assaults where the shared definition of the situation is that the victim is a
patient who has come to see the defendant for medical treatment or
professional services. The perpetrator unexpectedly introduces a sexual
element into the encounter, and the victim is too shocked to object.
In State v. Sedia, the defendant, a physical therapist, used his penis to
vaginally penetrate a patient as she laid on an exam table.188 The parties
mutually understood that the victim was seeking physical therapy; she was
not in the office for sexual purposes. 189 Similarly, Mohajer v.
Commonwealth involved a massage therapist who “shoved” his penis into
the mouth of an eighteen-year-old first-time client.190 His conviction was
affirmed, although he tried to claim that the victim consented to his actions,

183

Id. at 517 (victim saw defendant as a mentor and father figure and as one of the
people that she most valued and trusted).
184
Id. at 514.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 514-15.
187
Id. at 514-15.
188
State v. Sedia, 614 So.2d 533, 534 (Fla. Ct. App. 1993).
189
Id.
190
Mohajer v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 359, 362 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
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despite coming as they did unexpectedly, and in the middle of a massage
that the victim had booked to celebrate her high school graduation.191
Larry Nassar is perhaps the best known physician who has abused his
position in order to sexually assault his patients. 192 Not a single one of
Nassar’s victims went to his office seeking a sexual encounter with him.
The same can be said of other physicians, such as Richard Strauss, who
assaulted at least 177 male students at The Ohio State University, and
gynecologist George Tyndall, who committed years of sexual assaults on
patients at the University of Southern California.193
None of the health care providers discussed here expressed their intent
to seek sexual contact prior to initiating it, nor did they give their victims
any opportunity to consent or decline prior to sexual contact. These cases
illustrate a broader range of scenarios where perpetrators abuse a position of
authority—whether that is physician, teacher, psychologist, pastor, police
officer or jail warden—to seek sexual contact from those who do not have a
meaningful opportunity to consent in light of the nature of the relationship
between the parties.194
191

Id. at 361.
Benjamin Hoffman, Gymnastics Doctor Larry Nassar Pleads Guilty to Molestation
Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/22/sports/larrynassar-gymnastics-molestation.html (Ingham County, Mich. case); Christine Hauser, Larry
Nassar Is Sentenced to Another 40 to 125 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/sports/larry-nassar-sentencing-hearing.html (Eaton
County, MI. case); Maggie Astor, Gymnastics Doctor Who Abused Patients Gets 60 Years
(Dec.
7,
2017),
for
Child
Pornography,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/07/sports/larry-nassar-sentence-gymnastics.html
(federal case).
193
Caryn Trombino & Markus Funk, Perkins Coie LLP, Report of the Independent
Investigation: Sexual Abuse Committed by Dr. Richard Strauss at The Ohio State
University
1
(2019),
https://presspage-productioncontent.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/2170/finalredactedstraussinvestigationreport471531.pdf?10000; Alan Blinder, Officials Ignored ‘Clear Evidence’ of Abuse by Ohio
(Aug.
30,
2019),
State
Doctor,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/sports/ohio-state-doctorabuse.html?searchResultPosition=2; Victor Mather, Ohio State Finds Team Doctor
(May
17,
2019),
Sexually
Abused
177
Students,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/17/sports/ohio-state-sexualabuse.html?searchResultPosition=4; Harriet Ryan et al., A USC Doctor Was Accused of
Bad Behavior with Young Women for Years. The University Let Him Continue Treating
(May
16,
2018,
6:25
AM),
Students,
L.A.
TIMES
https://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-usc-doctor-misconduct-complaints20180515-story.html.
194
New York declared people detained by police officers to be incapable of consent to
sex with the detaining officer(s) after the Anna Chambers case. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§130.05(j). Chambers was raped by two police officers while handcuffed and in their
custody; they claimed that she consented to sex. Natasha Lennard, NYPD Cops Who Raped
192
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Although some states have passed statutes declaring consent invalid
within certain relationships, the seeking consent standard renders some of
this parsing unnecessary, instead capturing all first-time encounters where
there is a violation of sexual agency due to a failure to seek consent.195 It is
impractical for legislators to identify every situation where status
differences between parties render the consent of one party void. The
seeking consent standard performs the needed function more effectively
given how common it is for perpetrators such as Nassar, Strauss, and others
in positions of power to commit First Encounter sexual assaults against
multiple victims.
D. College-age Sexual Predators, First Encounters, & Failing to Seek
Consent
Failing to seek consent during First Encounters is characteristic of many
sexual assaults involving college students. This is not surprising, because
institutions of higher education bring together large numbers of young
people who are becoming acquainted for the first time. These cases, like
many of the others we have examined, often begin when a perpetrator
initiates sexual touching without making his intentions clear and without
waiting for the victim’s consent before actually touching him or her.
Berkowitz, discussed supra, is an example of a First Encounter case in
the university context. There, when the victim entered the defendant’s dorm
room looking for someone, the defendant persuaded her to stay and then
initiated sexual contact by kissing the victim, touching her breasts, and
attempting to put his penis in her mouth. 196 He did these things without
warning, and when she said “no” repeatedly, he ignored her.197
Brooklyn Teen in Custody Get No Jail Time, THE INTERCEPT, (Aug. 30, 2019). At the time,
no New York statute declared people in custody to be incapable of consent under such
circumstances. Id.
195
See, e.g. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1412(A) (West, 2021)(providing for strict
liability for sexual contact between a peace officer and a person in his custody); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-7 (a)(6)(B) (West, 2021) )(providing for strict liability when a
psychotherapist has sexual intercourse with a current or former patient who is emotionally
dependent on the psychotherapist); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(b)(10), (b)(13) (West,
2021) (rendering consent void where the actor is a clergyman, coach, or tutor who exploits
a person’s dependency on the actor). Additionally, numerous scholars have debated the
question of when status differentials render consent to sex void and when they do not. For a
fuller discussion, see ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 124-26 (1987); MACKINNON,
supra note 18 at 174-75; Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian
Existence, 5 SIGNS, 631 (1980); & SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX, supra note 37 at 47-59;
196
Berkowtiz, 609 A.2d at 1340.
197
Id.
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Brock Turner was a Stanford University freshman when he raped
Chanel Miller behind a dumpster, shortly after meeting her for the first time
at a campus party.198 Miller was too intoxicated to have given consent, and
she had no memory of being alone with any males and no memory of being
raped by Turner.199 Prior to assaulting Miller, Turner approached at least
two other women and touched them sexually shortly after meeting them,
without warning and without seeking their consent.200
John Krakauer provides several additional examples in his book
Missoula: Rape and the Justice System in a College Town. 201 Krakauer
gives an in-depth discussion of the justice system’s disastrous handling of
six separate sexual assaults on young women in Missoula between 2008 and
2012. 202 Each was a First Encounter, and most of them occurred within
hours of the first meeting between victim and defendant. 203 Nowhere in
Krakauer’s book or in the U.S. Justice Department’s report on their
investigation into Missoula is there any indication that law enforcement
agents were aware of and attached significance to the fact that rape is so
often reported in circumstances where victim and accused have never
shared prior sexual contact and often have just met.204
198

Liam Stack, Light Sentence for Brock Turner in Stanford Rape Case Draws
Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 6, 2016); see also CHANEL MILLER, KNOW MY NAME (2020).
199
People’s Sentencing Memorandum, People v. Turner, 4-5, 6-7 (Jun. 2, 2016).
200
Hannah Knowles, Brock Turner Trial Continues in Second Week of Testimony, THE
STANFORD DAILY (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.stanforddaily.com/2016/03/21/brockturner-trial-continues-in-second-week-of-testimony/ (stating that Turner tried to kiss the
victim’s sister despite the fact that he and the sister never spoke that evening); People’s
Sentencing Memorandum, People v. Turner, 7, 8, 14, 15 (Jun. 2, 2016) (stating that Turner
twice attempted to kiss one woman and put his hands on her waist without her consent;
became “touchy” with another woman at a party and touched her waist, stomach, and upper
thighs without her consent; and describing Turner as a “predator who is searching for
prey”).
201
JON KRAKAUER, MISSOULA: RAPE AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN A COLLEGE TOWN
(2016).
202
Krakauer details the cases of rape victims Keely Williams, Allison Huguet, Kelsey
Belnap, Kerry Barrett, Kaitlynn Kelly, and Cecilia Washburn. Id. at 3, 19, 34, 51, 71 &
147. Krakauer describes three additional rapes with unnamed victims and perpetrators
which also appear to be First Encounters. Id. at 127, 143.
203
Id. at 3, 21, 38, 57, 71, 119, 143, 147, & 165.
204
Letter from Michael W. Cotter, United States Attorney, Dist. of Montana &
Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Royce C. Engstrom,
President,
Univ.
of
Montana
(May
9,
2013)
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/missoulafind_5-9-13.pdf; Letter from
Michael W. Cotter, United States Attorney, Dist. of Montana & Thomas E. Perez, Assistant
Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div., to John Engen, Mayor (May 15, 2013) available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/missoulapdfind_5-15-13.pdf; Letter from
Jocelyn Samuels, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Civil Rights Div. & Michael Cotter,
United States Attorney, Dist. of Montana, &, to Fred Van Valkenburg, Cnty. Attorney
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To the contrary, one police detective quoted in Missoula stated that
“[i]t’s not easy to throw people in jail when it’s a ‘he said, she said’
scenario.”205 That comment ignores a very clear pattern—the prevalence of
First Encounter offending where the parties are barely acquainted, and the
perpetrator uses sexual aggression, often against intoxicated or unconscious
victims. Most of the Missoula cases involve victims who were either asleep
or heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault.206 Several woke up to find
the accused penetrating them as they slept; in one case the victim woke to
violent digital penetration of her vagina and anus, and the accused would
not stop even when she clearly told him to.207
These cases also demonstrate the value of adjudicating acquaintance
rape cases under a seeking consent standard. All of the cases described in
Missoula were First Encounters. Approaching them by presuming
nonconsent and then evaluating the defendants’ actions in seeking consent
is revealing. In four of the cases featuring sleeping victims, each was
awoken not by a polite request by the defendant for sexual activity, but by
the sensation of being penetrated as she slept.208 These perpetrators simply
initiated sexual activity without communicating with the victim at all. At
least two of these five victims were heavily intoxicated as well as
unconscious, with the accused having played an active role in encouraging
the victims’ drinking prior to the sexual assault.209
Just one of the Missoula cases involved a victim who was awake and
not intoxicated; she reported that a football player used his greater size and
strength to physically pin her down and assault her. 210 When he sought
physical intimacy with her, she repeatedly said no and asked him to go back
to their agreed-upon activity of watching a movie, but he ignored her
protests.211
Krakauer’s book and the Justice Department’s investigation into sexual
assault in Missoula revealed substantial deficiencies in law enforcement’s
approach to investigating non-stranger sexual assault, including gender bias
(Feb.
14,
2014)
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/missoula_ltr_2-14-14.pdf.
(hereinafter
“Van Valkenburg Letter”).
205
KRAKAUER, supra note 200 at 72.
206
Id. at 3, 12, 19-20, 34-40, 51-53, 69.
207
Id. at 64. That assault left blood on the victim’s pillow, on two walls near her bed,
and “all over” her sheets. Id. at 65. That assailant was expelled from the university but not
criminally prosecuted. Id. at 100-01.
208
Id. at 12, 19, 53, 69. A fifth victim felt a penis thrust into her mouth and then
blacked out. Id. at 36.
209
Id. at 19, 36.
210
Id. at 137-38.
211
Id. at 136.
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and other issues.212 The seeking consent standard brings helpful clarity to
the task of building strong cases for prosecution, because it focuses the
analysis on the perpetrator’s conduct rather than the victim’s. An offendercentered investigation that frames the inquiry around seeking consent can
help police to more clearly see the nonconsensual nature of the types of
cases described in Missoula, which frequently feature perpetrators
penetrating unconscious or intoxicated First Encounter victims without even
attempting to seek consent.
E. Worst Case Scenarios: First Encounters and Serial Offenders
It is well known that most sexual assaults occur among acquaintances,
and I have furthered argued that these assaults are very often committed in
the First Encounter context by perpetrators who fail to seek consent. It is
also the case that many sexual predators are serial offenders. Accordingly,
when sexual predators are left to offend for long periods of time—because
of poor police investigations and/or because police are skeptical of the
victims—they often commit a large number of assaults. Many of these are
First Encounters that involve no effort to seek consent.
From the predator’s standpoint, the goal is to maneuver the victim into a
situation where sexual contact is possible, carry out the assault, and then
move onto the next victim. We have seen several cases where predators
accomplish this goal by building a basic level of trust with the victim and
then unilaterally changing the definition of the situation without giving the
victim the opportunity to respond before the sexual violation begins.
Because predators are interested in extracting sex rather than forming on
ongoing relationship with their victims, they do not need to know their
victims well, just well enough to make the rape look like consensual sex to
the fact-finder. As long as we ignore the significance of First Encounter
sexual assault, this is not difficult.
David Lisak uses the term “undetected rapists” to describe sexual
predators who evade detection for long periods of time.213 Lisak argues that
such predators use strategies that allow them to avoid detection such as
212

For instance, Krakauer documents a police officer asking a victim whether she had
a boyfriend and then explaining that “sometimes girls cheat on their boyfriends, and regret
it, and then claim they were raped.” Id. at 54. See generally Van Valkenburg Letter, supra
note 238 (evidence of gender bias, animus towards victims, and other problems preventing
the prosecution of non-stranger sexual assault).
213
David Lisak, Understanding the Predatory Nature of Sexual Violence 1, 6-7 (2008),
https://www.innovations.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/134841.pdf. See also notes 216-237
and accompanying text.
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grooming their victims, testing victims’ boundaries, and isolating them as
precursors to sexual assault. 214 Lisak’s work helps to explain why some
sexual predators manage to commit hundreds of assaults without being
detected.215
Reynhard Sinaga is one example of a sexual predator who operated
repeatedly in the First Encounter context, using the behaviors identified by
Lisak. Sinaga is thought by police to have raped 206 men between 2005 and
2017 in Manchester, England.216 In 2020, he was convicted of forty-eight
rapes and sentenced to at least forty years in prison.217 Each of Sinaga’s
rapes were Brief Encounters.218 Sinaga’s modus operandi was to find young
men who were leaving the bars near his home at closing time and who were
in some sort of distress—heavily intoxicated, without money, or needing to
charge dead phone batteries.219 Sinaga invited each victim to his apartment
to charge their phones, have another drink, and sleep for a few hours.220 The
fact that he was slightly built made him appear nonthreatening to his
victims.221 Sinaga raped his victims as they slept.222

214

Lisak, supra note 213 at 7 (arguing that undetected rapists (1) are “extremely adept
at identifying ‘likely’ victims,” testing their boundaries, and isolating them; (2) plan and
premeditate their attacks; (3) typically use only the amount of violence necessary to coerce
victims into submission; (4) use psychological weapons rather than physical force, and (5)
“use alcohol to deliberately render victims more vulnerable to attack”).
215
Id. at 4-5. There is some controversy around Lisak’s work. For a brief treatment of some
of these critiques see Tyler Kingkade, Researchers Push Back On Criticisms Of WellKnown Serial Rapist Study, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2015).
216
Helen Pidd & Josh Halliday, ‘I thought, OK, he goes for drunk guys’: friends and
flatmates on the Reynhard Sinaga they knew, GUARDIAN (January 25, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/jan/25/friends-flatmates-reynhard-sinaga.
217
Alexandra Topping & Helen Pidd, UK court increases minimum jail terms of two
serial
rapists
to
40
years,
Guardian
(December
11,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/dec/11/uk-court-increases-minimum-jailterms-of-two-serial-rapists-to-40-years-joseph-mccann-reynard-sinaga.
218
Helen Pidd, How serial rapist posed as a good Samaritan to lure victims,
(January
6,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/ukGUARDIAN
news/2020/jan/06/reynhard-sinaga-serial-rapist-posed-good-samaritan-lure-men
[hereinafter “Serial Rapist”].
219
Helen Pidd & Josh Halliday, Reynhard Sinaga jailed for life for raping dozens of
men in Manchester, Guardian (January 6, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/uknews/2020/jan/06/reynhard-sinaga-jailed-life-drugging-raping-men-manchester
[hereinafter Sinaga Jailed]; Pidd, Serial Rapist, supra note 253.
220
Pidd & Halliday, Sinaga Jailed, supra note 219; Pidd, Serial Rapist, supra note
218.
221
Pidd & Halliday, Sinaga Jailed, supra note 219; Pidd, Serial Rapist, supra note
218.
222
Pidd & Halliday, Sinaga Jailed, supra note 219; Pidd, Serial Rapist, supra note
218.
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According to the prosecution, Sinaga selected an apartment near several
bars for the express purpose of luring victims to his home at closing time.223
He was discovered only when his last victim awoke during the assault and
called police. 224 But Sinaga’s conduct at that time was still poorly
understood. The victim, who was a physically larger man than Sinaga, was
treated as a suspect for assaulting Sinaga and was held in custody for
several hours; police did not believe his statement that he had been sexually
assaulted.225 Police only grasped the true nature of the situation when they
discovered video footage on Sinaga’s phone of his numerous sexual assaults
on sleeping men.226
There are numerous other examples of sexual predators who pursue
multiple victims by engaging in a Brief Encounter with each one after
establishing some level of trust. Harvey Weinstein assaulted numerous
women who sought his help in advancing their careers in the film
industry.227 He would summon the women to a meeting in a hotel room and
would proceed to sexually assault each one, usually in a First Encounter
context.228
Jeffrey Epstein sought under-aged girls whom he had never met for
sexual encounters, and he used co-conspirators to lure them to his home,
promising to pay them hundreds of dollars for “massages.”229 But once he
was alone with them, he would reveal the true purpose of the interaction by
ordering them to undress and engaging in sexual contact with them during

223
Katerina Vittozzi, Reynhard Sinaga: UK’s worst serial rapist handed multiple life
sentences for campaign against men, SKY NEWS (January 7, 2020, 6:53 A.M.),
https://news.sky.com/story/reynhard-sinaga-serial-rapist-handed-multiple-life-sentencesfor-violent-campaign-11902070; Britain’s most prolific rapist jailed for life following
historic CPS prosecution, CPS (January 6, 2020), https://www.cps.gov.uk/northwest/news/britains-most-prolific-rapist-jailed-life-following-historic-prosecution;
Pidd,
Serial Rapist, supra note 218.
224
Pidd, Serial Rapist, supra note 218; Nazia Parveen, Reynhard Sinaga victim: ‘I
thought I might have killed him’, GUARDIAN (January 26, 2020, 9:15 A.M.),
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2020/jan/26/reynhard-sinaga-victim-i-thought-imight-have-killed-him.
225
Parveen, supra note 224.
226
Id.; Pidd, Serial Rapist, supra note 218.
227
Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual Harassment Accusers
for Decades, NEW YORK TIMES, (Oct. 5, 2017).
228
Id.
229
In re Courtney Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1198 (Apr. 14, 2020); JULIE K. BROWN,
PERVERSION OF JUSTICE: THE JEFFREY EPSTEIN STORY xi, 105-06, 108 (2021) (stating that
Epstein “[d]idn’t want experienced women; his preferred prey were waiflike prepubescent
girls from troubled backgrounds who needed money and had little or no sexual experience).
Id. at xi-xii.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4191840

DATE]

SEX AND NONCONSENT

47

the massage.230 The victims often did not expect to engage in any sexual
activity with Epstein, and some learned that they could get paid for bringing
new girls to him if they did not want to repeat the sexual experience.231
Epstein and Weinstein both committed sexual assault repeatedly in a First
Encounter context.
The case of Jonas Dick, Alexander Smith, and Jason Berlin highlights
how predators can become expert at their craft when they engage in a
pattern of First Encounter coercion and sexual assault without being
detected by police. Dick and Smith ran an entity called “Efficient Pickup”
through which they accepted fee-paying clients who wanted to learn how to
“seduce” women.232 Berlin was their student.233 Much like Sinaga, Smith
taught his students to “go to bars at closing time to find a woman and to
have an apartment nearby to take her to afterward.” 234 Dick and Smith
approached one heavily intoxicated victim outside of a San Diego bar at
closing time and invited her to an apartment.235 Once there, they gave her
something to drink, and Smith and Berlin then took turns raping her as she
drifted in and out of consciousness.236 The defendants were prosecuted as a
result of the victim’s own efforts at investigating her case and finding
online evidence of the men bragging about sexually assaulting her as well
as other women. 237 The trial judge declared that the victim deserved an
award for her investigatory work because:
“But for you, he wouldn’t be here…Nobody would be held
accountable….In fact, worse than that, things would have gone on
and there would be other victims, and it is quite possible we would
have never learned about this.”238
These cases featuring seasoned predators demonstrate the worst-case
scenarios that develop when predators are left unchecked and ignored by
law enforcement for long periods of time. The fact that most of the sexual
230

BROWN, supra note 229 at xi, 107-08, ; JAMES PATTERSON, FILTHY RICH 68-71

(2016).
231

In re Courtney Wild, 955 F.3d 1196, 1198 (Apr. 14, 2020); BROWN, supra note 229
at xi, 108; PATTERSON, supra note 230 at 71.
232
People v Smith, WL 6521853, 1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
233
Id. at 2.
234
Id. at 4.
235
Id. at 1.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 2; Dana Littlefield, Rape victim did her own detective work to find her
assailants, L.A. TIMES, (Jan. 30, 2017) (“[t]he real break in this case came from the
victim’s own investigation.”)
238
Id.
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assaults committed by these individuals occurred in a First Encounter
context reveals a common denominator that we have been missing and the
importance of a path forward that takes this dynamic into account and
applies a seeking consent standard. These predators differed somewhat in
terms of whether they used alcohol, drugs, or force to accomplish rape, but
what they all had in common was repeatedly engaging in First Encounter
sexual penetration or contact without seeking consent. Applying a legal
standard that takes the First Encounter context into account and applies a
seeking consent standard would focus police and prosecutors squarely on
the predatory nature of this conduct.
Part Three has demonstrated that a large number of sexual assaults take
place between acquaintances in First Encounter scenarios where the
defendant initiates sexual contact or penetration without seeking the
victim’s consent. Despite the fact that this pattern of offending repeats itself
again and again, rape law has ignored First Encounter dynamics and the
ubiquity of this type of offending. Sexual predators are able to amass a large
number of victims when police ignore them, leaving them to exploit First
Encounter dynamics repeatedly without getting caught. In this way,
offenders improve their predatory skills, gain experience in successfully
evading detection, and become emboldened to commit more assaults. To
remedy this inequity, rape law must recognize the presumption of
nonconsent that precedes First Encounter sexual assault through the
development of a crime of sexual contact without seeking consent.
PART FOUR: BUILDING UPON AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT APPROACHES
This article’s Seeking Consent proposal harmonizes with, but also goes
beyond, current understandings of affirmative consent. Affirmative consent
is sexual consent defined as an active expression of willingness to engage in
sexual activity rather than mere passive acquiescence.239 As California puts
it, “[a]ffirmative consent means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary
agreement to engage in sexual activity.” 240 Support for affirmative
consent—the Yes Model—is spreading across constituencies, despite its
critics.
Colleges and universities began to focus substantial attention on the
problem of sexual assault on college campuses about ten years ago and have
since enthusiastically embraced affirmative consent when adjudicating
239

For an excellent explanation of the “Yes Model” and “No Model” approaches to
consent in sexual assault law, see Michelle Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 1408-14 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2005).
240
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(1) (West 2021).
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sexual assault cases.241 As of 2015, over 1,400 colleges and universities in
the United States used an affirmative consent standard for sexual assault
claims. 242 Certain states, including California, Connecticut, Illinois, and
New York, have passed legislation requiring higher education institutions to
adopt an affirmative consent standard when adjudicating sexual assault
cases.243
Opponents of affirmative consent argue that the standard places the
burden of proof upon the accused to demonstrate that he obtained consent to
each sexual act, and that such a burden interferes with the accused’s right to
avoid self-incrimination, effectively forcing him to speak at trial.244 In fact,
the burden of proof remains with the state when an affirmative consent
standard is used; the prosecutor must prove that the sexual contact took
place in the absence of the victim’s freely given agreement.245 Canada’s use
of affirmative consent in its criminal justice system for nearly thirty years
demonstrates that it is workable in the criminal context.246
The American Law Institute (“ALI”) declined to endorse an affirmative
consent standard as part of the Model Penal Code Revision process in 2016,
and the American Bar Association refused to do so in 2019.247 In so doing,
241

See generally Janet Napolitano, “Only Yes Means Yes”: An Essay on University
Policies Regarding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, 387, 389 YALE LAW & POLICY
REV. (2015). See also note 241-242.
242
Sandy Keenan, Affirmative Consent: Are Students Really Asking, NEW YORK TIMES
(Jul. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/02/education/edlife/affirmative-consentare-students-reallyasking.html#:~:text=An%20estimated%201%2C400%20institutions%20of,standards%2C
%20last%20fall%2C%20followed%20by.
243
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a)(1), (2) (West 2021); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10a55m(a)(1), (b)(1); 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 155/10(1) (West 2019); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 6441(1) (McKinney 2021); Jillian Gilchrest, Consent and Connecticut Law: Ensuring
criminal justice keeps pace with today’s culture, CT Mirror (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://ctmirror.org/category/ct-viewpoints/consent-and-connecticut-law-ensuring-criminaljustice-keeps-pace-with-todays-culture/.
244
Alan Dershowitz, Opinion: Innocent until proven guilty? Not under ‘yes means yes.’
WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2015).
245
See notes 247-259 and accompanying text.
246
See generally Vandervort, supra note 16.
247

Bradford Richardson, American Law Institute rejects affirmative consent standard
in defining sexual assault, WASHINGTON TIMES (May 17, 2016); Amanda Robert,
Contentious resolution seeking to redefine consent in sexual assault cases is postponed,
ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/resolution-114.
Revision to the MPC’s sexual offense provisions is long overdue. See, e.g. Deborah W.
Denno, Why the Model Penal Code’s Sexual Offense Provisions Should be Pulled and
Replaced, OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 207, 207 (2003). 2016 was a crucial year for examining
affirmative consent. Not only did ALI vote to reject affirmative consent in the MPC sexual
offenses revision process that year, but numerous scholars wrote about the state of affairs
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these organizations have turned away from the embrace of affirmative
consent in higher education, in Canada, and, increasingly, in American state
legislatures. Prior to ALI’s 2016 vote, some form of affirmative consent
was already used in the criminal law of several states, although these state
statutes vary in complexity and function.248 Since ALI’s vote, even more
states have embraced affirmative consent as a criminal law requirement.
States that incorporate an affirmative definition of consent into statutory
or case law use a range of approaches, and the result is rather complex
terrain.249 However, there are at least nine jurisdictions that include consent
as an element of the crime of sexual assault and that define that consent in
affirmative terms.250 In each of these jurisdictions, a defendant can be held
criminally liable for engaging in sexual contact in the absence of a freely
given indication of consent from the victim.
New Jersey, Vermont, and Wisconsin included affirmative consent as an
element of rape or sexual assault prior to 2016, the year that ALI rejected
it.251 New Hampshire also did so prior to 2016, in part through supreme
court jurisprudence, and two additional jurisdictions—Minnesota and the
District of Columbia—already treated sexual contact without affirmative
consent as a misdemeanor at that time.252
surround affirmative consent around the same time. See, e.g. Kimberly Ferzan, Consent,
Culpability, and the Law of Rape OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 397 (2016); Aya Gruber, Consent
Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415 (2016), Mary Graw Leary, Affirmatively Replacing
Rape Culture with Consent Culture; TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2016); Melissa Murray &
Karen Tani, Something Old, Something New: Reflections on the Sex Bureaucracy, CAL. L.
REV. ONLINE 122 (2016); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 16;
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Consent: What it Means and Why It’s Time to Require It; 47 U. Pac.
L. Rev. 665 (2016) (hereinafter “Consent”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Reforming the Law of
Rape, 35 LAW & INEQ. 335 (2017) (hereinafter (“Reforming”).
247
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 §§ 3251(3), 3252(a)(1); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 940.225(1)-(4) (West
2021).
248
See notes 248-51 and accompanying text; see also Tuerkheimer, Affirmative
Consent, supra note 16 at 449-451.
249
Id. at 449-451. State affirmative consent requirements can loosely be divided into
what Tuerkheimer terms “pure” and “diluted” approaches. Broadly speaking, “pure”
affirmative consent jurisdictions use an affirmative consent standard to adjudicate consent
as an element of the charged crime with no separate force requirement. In “diluted”
jurisdictions, the affirmative consent requirement is somehow attenuated. Id. at 451.
250
The nine jurisdictions are the District of Columbia, Minnesota, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See notes [. ]
and accompany text.
251
For instance, Vermont’s sexual assault statute reads, in part, “[n]o person shall
engage in a sexual act with another person without the consent of the other person.” Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 3252(a)(1)(West 2021).
252
MINN. STAT. §§ 609.341(4), 609.3451, 609.342 - § 609.345.; D.C. CODE ANN. §§
22-3001, 22-3006.
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Moreover, several jurisdictions strengthened their embrace of
affirmative consent since the actions by ALI and the ABA. Vermont has
defined “consent” affirmatively since 2005, but effective July 2021, it
clarified that the presence of ambiguity means a lack of consent.253 New
Jersey, in 2021, codified its 1992 supreme court holding, statutorily
defining sexual assault to include sexual penetration or sexual contact
without affirmative consent.254
Since 2016, three additional states have incorporated affirmative
consent into their criminal law, with Oklahoma embracing it right around
the time of ALI’s rejection. 255 Montana has long defined rape as sexual
intercourse without consent, but in 2017 the state incorporated an
affirmative definition of consent as “words or overt actions indicating a
freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.”256 In
2019, Washington state also took action. 257 The state had previously
defined consent in affirmative terms, but with a requirement that lack of
consent had to be “clearly expressed by the victim's words or conduct.”258
The legislature removed that requirement in 2019, effectively construing
ambiguity as a lack of consent.259
This brief survey demonstrates that at least nine American jurisdictions
have adopted an affirmative consent requirement in relation to one or more

253
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 3251(c); 2021 Vermont Laws No. 68 (H. 183), Vermont
2021 Sessions Laws, 2021-2022 Legislative Session (Westlaw). The prior version read:
“Consent” means words or actions by a person indicating a voluntary agreement to engage
in a sexual act. Vt. Session Laws, 2021-22 Legis. Session, No. 68, H. 183.
254
State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN §§ 2C:14-2(a)(5),
2C:14-2(a)(6), 2C:14-2(c)(1)(indicating that lawful sexual contact requires “affirmative
and freely given permission,” as well as a lack of coercion) (West 2021).
255
Effective June 2016, consent in Oklahoma has been defined as “the affirmative,
unambiguous and voluntary agreement to engage in a specific sexual activity during a
sexual encounter which can be revoked at any time. OKLA. STAT. TIT. 21 § 113.
256
MONT. CODE ANN § 45-5-503.; MONT. CODE ANN § 45-5-503. 2017 Montana Laws
Ch. 279 (S.B. No. 29) (Approved May 4, 2017. Eff. date Oct. 1, 2017). Montana made this
legislative change in response to a federal investigation, in 2012, into rape prosecution
failures in Missoula, and after publication of Jon Krakauer’s 2015 book on the same topic.
Gabriel Furshong, Montana legislature grapples with sexual violence, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (Mar. 7, 2017). See also notes 235-47 and accompanying text.
257
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9A.44.060(1)(a). Class C felonies carry a five year
maximum prison term. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9A.20.021(c).
258
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9A.44.060(1)(a).
259
“ “Consent” means that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact
there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual
intercourse or sexual contact.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7): 9A.44.010.
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forms of sexual contact. 260 The fact that New Jersey and Vermont have
recently strengthened this requirement while Montana, Oklahoma, and
Washington have added one indicates that momentum for affirmative
consent is building rather than subsiding, apparently unaffected by the
recent rejection of the concept by ALI and the ABA.
Nor are such developments restricted to the United States. New South
Wales, Australia introduced affirmative consent reforms into their criminal
law effective June 1, 2022, using an approach that is even more
comprehensive than those seen in the above-referenced American states.
Under the New South Wales approach, a person who wants to engage in
sexual activity with someone must “say or do something to seek consent,”
or the other person must “do or say something to show consent.” 261 A
belief in consent is not reasonable when a person has said or done nothing
to seek it. 262 Further, it is impermissible to assume that someone is
consenting because they do not say no; “silence is not consent.”263 The law
also clarifies that consent can only be given “freely and voluntarily;” a
person cannot consent when asleep, unconscious, intoxicated, or subjected
to force or coercion.264
The new law has been introduced with the help of an education
campaign, “Make No Doubt,” designed to ensure that everyone understands
the new law as well as to change social behavior “with clearer rules of
engagement to drive down the rate of sexual assaults.”265
The proposal offered here both builds on this momentum and goes
beyond it. The Seeking Consent approach harmonizes with the Yes Model
but focuses the analysis on the perpetrator’s actions in seeking consent
rather than on the victim’s actions in giving it—an important corrective
when analyzing sexual aggression. My proposal also incorporates into the
analysis, for the first time, the key practice of analyzing whether the alleged
260

These are the District of Columbia, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Oklahoma, Vermont, Washington, & Wisconsin. See notes 250-258 and
accompanying text.
261
Consent Reforms Become Law in NSW, NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY (Jun 1, 2022)
https://nswliberal.org.au/Shared-Content/News/2022/Consent-reforms-become-law-inNSW?utm_source=miragenews&utm_medium=miragenews&utm_campaign=news
(hereinafter “Consent in NSW”); Tamsin Rose, NSW Affirmative Consent Laws: What Do
They Mean and How Will They Work?, GUARDIAN (Jun. 1, 2022).
262
Crimes Legislation Amendment Bill 2021, New South Wales, Schd. 1, Sub. 1A,
61HK(2) (“a belief that the other person consents to sexual activity is not reasonable if the
accused person did not, within a reasonable time before or at the time of the sexual activity,
say or do anything to find out whether the other person consents to the sexual activity.”)
263
Consent in NSW, supra note 262.
264
Id.
265
Id.; see also Check Consent, Every Time, NEW SOUTH WALES GOVERNMENT,
https://www.makenodoubt.dcj.nsw.gov.au/#checkconsent.
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assault was a First Encounter and the great potential this type of analysis
holds for greater fairness in rape law. I have also demonstrated how the
proposal could be applied across a wide range of cases, and how it
complements the Yes Model, which can still be used in cases where it is
necessary to analyze whether the victim gave consent.
The seeking consent approach offers the advantage of a clear bright line
that is easy to understand—for victims, those accused, and law enforcement
authorities alike. It tells the sex initiator that before touching another person
sexually for the first time, it is necessary to seek permission, and to be
certain that the other person has unambiguously indicated, through words or
actions, a willingness for the initiator to proceed. If he is not sure, he must
refrain from sexual contact. The law further instructs him to expect that the
law will presume that a person who has never before consented to sexual
contact with him has maintained that stance, absent a clear and
unambiguous indication to the contrary.
This clear bright line rule makes the law clear to everyone concerned
and has the potential to greatly reduce sexual assault in the First Encounter
context. It is an easy rule to learn—one must seek consent of the other party
prior to touching them sexually. An educational campaign similar to the
New South Wales “Make No Doubt” campaign can reinforce the message.
This approach will be opposed, perhaps vehemently, by those who have
benefitted from society’s tolerance of sexual aggression, but if we are
concerned with protecting victims of all ages, genders, and races from
sexual assault, this bright line is the most fair and effective way to construe
sexual assault laws. We must fully abandon, at long last, the sexist notion,
embraced by decades of sexual assault law, that women can be seen as
voluntarily submitting to men’s sexual initiative unless they actively object
by resisting or saying “no.”266
Moreover, given the serious invasion of privacy that is involved in
touching someone sexually without his or her consent, as well as the longlasting psychological trauma that can result, it is fair and just to place the
266

Michelle Anderson demonstrates the heterosexist assumptions underlying rape
law’s archaic notions of consent; see Anderson, Negotiating Sex, supra note 240 at 140809. As late as 1994, Donald Dripps demonstrated that the view that it was fine for a man to
touch a woman without her consent was still alive and well:
“Women are expected to object when male advances exceed female preference.
Unless a man either exploits an unconscious or incompetent victim, or induces a
woman’s acquiescence by violence or some other wrongful pressure, this doesn’t
seem like so much to ask.”
Dripps, Panel Discussion, Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 146
(1994); quoted in Anderson, supra note 240 at 1411.
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burden on the person initiating the sexual contact to be sure that he has clear
and unambiguous consent before acting.
To paraphrase an Idaho court writing in 1907: a person who takes the
liberty of touching another person sexually without her or his consent does
so “at his own risk.”267 It is the person initiating the sexual contact who has
the power to avoid unlawful contact by being cautious about seeking
consent in advance of touching. That person can “incur the risk and hazard”
of misjudging the situation and facing the legal consequences.268 If he is
not sure, he can simply refrain from touching. That Idaho court went on to
note:
“A little of this kind of law would go a long way with some of the
brutes who unfortunately bear the names of men. There would be far
less illicit intercourse if there were no assaults by the seducer in the first
place, and the oftener he is brought to justice the less annoyance the
community will suffer from the graver offenses towards which his
conduct leads.”269
Although the “illicit intercourse” framing may no longer resonate today,
this opinion effectively captures the sexual violation that we see repeatedly
in First Encounter cases. These cases are not the result of
miscommunication between the well-intentioned; rather, they are the result
of deliberate predatory conduct and sexual aggression. The more diligent
we are at identifying and prosecuting this conduct, the safer our
communities will be.
PART FIVE: OBJECTIONS TO THE SEEKING CONSENT APPROACH
As with most proposals to reform rape law, there will be objections or
concerns about the proposal’s scope. I will address three of those here—two
that have to do with criminalizing sex, and one pertaining to equity in how
First Encounter and repeat encounter cases are treated. The objections
addressed here raise important concerns, but none are compelling enough to
negate the value of the seeking consent approach.
A. Is the Proposal Overbroad?

267

State v. Neil, 90 P. 860, 862 (Idaho 1907). I have paraphrased in order to avoid
some of the archaic language in the original opinion.
268
Id.
269
Id.
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First is the concern that the proposal could be overbroad and
accordingly result in a flood of prosecutions, particularly in relation to
sexually inexperienced but well-intentioned young people. The framework I
propose criminalizes the act of engaging in sexual contact or penetration
with another person for the first time without seeking consent. In this way
it puts nonconsensual sexual contact on the same level as battery statutes,
which typically criminalize offensive touching without any analysis of
whether the victim consented to the offensive touching.270 Rather, the law
presumes a lack of consent to offensive touching as a result of the offensive
nature of the touch.
My proposal simply asserts what should be obvious – that when sexual
contact occurs between an initiator and complainant for the first time
without the initiator making any effort to find out whether the other person
consents, we should presume that the touching is offensive, much like a
battery would be. If the touching is not offensive to the complainant, the
initiator is free to rely on an affirmative defense that consent existed and
that he believed consent existed. It is then his burden to demonstrate what
words or actions the complainant used express that consent. The availability
of this affirmative defense of consent, as in relation to battery, helps to
protect the accused.
That New South Wales has recently incorporated a requirement that sex
initiators seek consent before sexual contact, and that they have
implemented an education campaign on this issue, demonstrates that the
real issue here is changing social norms around sex, gender-role
expectations, and consent. Rather than the proposal being overbroad, it,
like the Yes Model of affirmative consent, requires us to fully abandon the
outdated notion that sexual aggression is acceptable unless the complainant
actively presents physical or verbal resistance. People should not have to do
anything in order to be left alone sexually. The New South Wales “Make
No Doubt” campaign places responsibility on the sex initiator to ensure that
the recipient of sexual contact has consented to the contact.
Additionally, and as a practical matter, Professor Tuerkheimer’s
analysis of case law in existing affirmative consent jurisdictions shows that
prosecutors typically do not focus on cases where miscommunication is at
270

Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 242 (West 2021) (A battery is any willful and unlawful use
of force or violence upon the person of another); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN §
5/12.3(a)(West 2021) (A person commits battery if he or she knowingly without legal
justification by any means … makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature
with an individual); Tx. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a)(3) (West 2021) (a person commits an
offense if he or she “intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when
the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as
offensive or provocative.
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issue. 271 Similarly, my analysis demonstrates that First Encounter cases
featuring sexually aggressive conduct, rather than miscommunication,
dominate case law. There is little reason for prosecutors to focus on more
ambiguous “miscommunication” cases when First Encounter sexual
aggression cases are abundant.
B. Will the Proposal Exacerbate Existing Disparities in Prosecution
Rates?
Second is the concern that any effort to increase the number of
sexual assault prosecutions will lead to a disproportionate emphasis on
prosecuting “the usual suspects” – those disadvantaged by forms of bias,
whether implicit or explicit, such as race and socioeconomic status. The
crux of the problem here is that prosecutorial discretion allows such bias to
operate with impunity.272 The seeking consent approach and its clear bright
line rule have the potential to alleviate such bias, because this approach
makes it easier to build strong cases for prosecution, in turn increasing the
odds that prosecutors will bring cases against more sex offenders from
wealthy and/or racially advantaged backgrounds.
Sex crimes are vastly under-reported, under-investigated, and underprosecuted. Failing to improve this state of affairs means failing large
numbers of victims, many of whom are marginalized and vulnerable based
on their race, age or socioeconomic status. To shy away from the important
work of improving sexual assault conviction rates out of a concern for
biased law enforcement is untenable. We must work to eliminate bias while
also improving conviction rates, protecting potential sexual assault victims,
and making all communities safer for victims and less protective of
perpetrators. The seeking consent approach is just, equitable, and easy to
understand. For all of those reasons, it has the potential to chill a great deal
of sexual assault.

271

Deborah Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 247 at 444 (concluding that
“even in the affirmative consent jurisdictions, cases involving a plausible claim of a
reasonable mistake are far eclipsed by cases where miscommunication is not an issue.”),
445, 468 (“miscommunication appears to be far less of a concern than opponents [of
affirmative consent] have suggested….”).
272
William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, YALE L. J. 1, 27-30 (1997) (identifying prosecutors’ practice of targeting
impoverished defendants in order to avoid the significant legal challenges that can be
brought by defendants able to hire private attorneys); BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING
THE INNOCENT, 163-67 (2011)(examining how a lack of financial resources impedes
defendants’ access to expert witnesses and other resources).
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If we are to rectify the under-prosecution of sexual assault, the
enormous public health costs that result, and the mental, emotional and
physical health consequences for victims,273 we must expect prosecutions to
increase dramatically under a more effective legal framework. When
prosecution numbers rise, some will inevitably argue that too much sexual
assault is being prosecuted. But we must judge each case on the evidence
and recognize that a large increase is to be expected when sex crimes have
been under-prosecuted for so long.
C. Does the Proposal Unfairly Prioritize First Encounter Sexual Assault?
A third concern is whether the proposal prioritizes prosecutions of
First Encounter sexual assault over those occurring in established
relationships. Although First Encounter sexual assault dominates case law,
sexual assault certainly occurs within established sexual relationships as
well and in fact may be even more under-reported than First Encounter
sexual assault. I join with Professors Schulhofer and Tuerkheimer in
supporting the Yes Model as the best approach to prosecuting all cases of
sexual assault where the presence or absence of consent is the critical
question.274
The First Encounter/Seeking Consent approach proposed in this Article
sets a new legal standard earlier in the adjudication process in First
Encounter cases. My proposal adds a more efficient way to prosecute such
cases posing a question that precedes the consent analysis. If the accused
has engaged in sexual penetration or contact without seeking consent, he
can be held liable for sexual assault. But if he can demonstrate that he did
not seek consent because he reasonably believed consent was already
present, then the court would proceed to conduct an analysis of consent
under the Yes Model, as it would in any non- First Encounter case.
273
For a discussion of the public health costs and consequences of sexual assault and
how to address them, see generally Alena Allen, Rape Messaging, 87 FORDHAM L. REV.
1033 (2018).
274
Professor Anderson rejects the Yes Model in favor of her negotiation model
because she believes that the Yes Model ultimately reverts to the No Model when there are
nuanced questions about how the victim expressed consent. Anderson, supra note 17 at
1412-14. I do not share this concern because existing caselaw in both the United States and
Canada demonstrates that courts are capable of analyzing whether the victim gave
affirmative and freely given consent. For examples of states that already use the Yes Model
in criminal prosecutions, see Tuerkheimer, Affirmative Consent, supra note 249 at 451-67.
For Canadian examples, see generally Vandervort, supra note 16. See also State v.
Lisasuain, 117 A.3d 1154 (N.H. 2015) (finding a lack of consent where the victim did
nothing).
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It makes sense to treat First Encounters with a bit more scrutiny around
consent-seeking conduct since sexual consent has never before existed in
such cases. This approach is akin to statutory rape laws that treat individuals
below a certain age as incapable of consent. That statutory presumption in
no way diminishes the seriousness of sexual assault occurring between
adults. Similarly, a statutory presumption—in the absence of clear evidence
to the contrary—that sexual consent does not exist between individuals who
have never before consented to sexual intimacy, fits the First Encounter
context and does nothing to diminish the seriousness of sexual assault
occurring within established relationships.
Some might argue that the seeking consent approach should be applied
to all sexual assault cases and not just to First Encounters. This may well be
the case, but in introducing the idea, I have chosen to focus only on First
Encounters here because the application of a seeking consent standard to
such cases should be particularly clear. Consent seeking within established
relationships is likely to be more nuanced and complex, and I leave that
issue to future scholarship.
CONCLUSION
This Article has described a pattern of sexually predatory behavior has
been repeated for decades, with courts largely missing the opportunity to
hold perpetrators accountable because the law has not defined the wrong of
sexual assault in terms of whether the accused sought the victim’s consent
prior to initiating sexual contact. In part, this oversight is because
conventional rape law has taught us to focus a skeptical eye on victims
rather than analyzing the conduct of those accused. We must change our
focus.
First Encounter cases help to illustrate how necessary it is to make this
change. Rape law should presume that people generally do not consent to
sexual contact with everyone they meet. The law must recognize that there
is a presumption of nonconsent that must be overcome before sexual contact
is lawful, mutual, and consensual. We therefore need an analytical focus
that appreciates the significance of First Encounter cases and considers
whether and how the perpetrator sought the victim’s consent before
initiating sexual contact. This approach respects the sexual agency of all
persons, makes sexual assault law clearer for everyone, and can correct the
under-prosecution and under-criminalization of sexual assault. We owe it to
all victims of sexual assault to adopt a seeking consent standard and thereby
treat sexual assault as the serious crime that it is.
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